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This issue marks the end of eight years of service by Alan Tomkins as thecoeditor of Court Review. While serving as a professor of law and psy-chology at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and the director of the
University of Nebraska Public Policy Center, Alan has helped us both improve
the quality of the articles in Court Review and get us current on this quarterly
publication.
Alan’s contributions have been vast, but I will mention a few. He edited our
2007 special issue on procedural justice; organized a special issue on Indian law,
including an overview of the Indian Child Welfare Act; recruited the nation’s
leading experts on eyewitness evidence to contribute to a special issue tailored
for judges; and regularly recruited leading experts
to make their work accessible to judges through
articles specially adapted for Court Review.
Alan is now taking on a new assignment as
Deputy Division Director for the National Science
Foundation’s Division of Social and Economic
Sciences. I will miss his help as coeditor, but we
all wish him well on his new assignment.
I’m pleased to announce that another talented
academic, Eve Brank, has agreed to come on
board as the coeditor going forward. Eve is an
associate professor in the University of Nebraska
Law-Psychology Program. She also serves as the
treasurer of the American Psychology-Law Society, a division of the American
Psychological Association. Having the continued help of a scholar who is well
connected to others working in areas of law and social science is a great asset for
Court Review and the judges who read it.
We’re pleased to have three articles we think you will find valuable:
• Professor Charles Weisselberg presents his annual review of the criminal
decisions in the past Term of the United States Supreme Court. As always,
he provides some analysis of the decisions and a discussion of key cases
already on the schedule for the present Term.
• Colorado trial judge David Prince considers ways  to mold the manage-
ment of civil litigation around procedural-justice and organizational-man-
agement research findings. Prince discusses how these findings should
frame a judge’s thinking about case management and makes specific 
suggestions.
• Two recent graduates of the University of Iowa College of Law, Kate Ono
Rahel and Justin Shilhanek, devoted much of their work in an immigra-
tion-law course during their third year to preparing an article for Court
Review. They and I agreed that a review of potential ramifications of the
Padilla v. Kentucky case, with guidelines for trial judges, would be useful.
Their excellent product concludes this issue.—Steve Leben
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unso-
licited, original articles, essays, and book reviews.
Court Review seeks to provide practical, useful infor-
mation to the working judges of the United States and
Canada.  In each issue, we hope to provide information
that will be of use to judges in their everyday work,
whether in highlighting new procedures or methods of
trial, court, or case management, providing substantive
information regarding an area of law likely to be
encountered by many judges, or by providing back-
ground information (such as psychology or other social
science research) that can be used by judges in their
work.  Guidelines for the submission of manuscripts
for Court Review are set forth on page 173 of this issue.
Court Review reserves the right to edit, condense, or
reject material submitted for publication.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For informa-
tion, contact Shelley Rockwell at (757) 259-1841.
Cover photo, Mary S. Watkins (maryswatkins@
mac.com). The cover photo is the Jasper County
Courthouse in Carthage, Missouri. Built in 1894, the
courthouse was listed on the National Register of His-
toric Places in 1973.
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They say what happens in Vegas stays in Vegas. Well, theAmerican Judges Association (AJA) met this October inLas Vegas and nothing will simply stay there. The edu-
cational sessions gave those in attendance an in-depth look at
important issues to the judiciary. There were sessions that dealt
with every aspect of judging, including a presentation by
Melissa Fitzgerald, former star of West Wing and current direc-
tor of Justice for Vets, on veterans treatment courts. There was
also time for a little fun, such as the fantastic AJA
banquet featuring the Motown-infused music of
InDemand, which had everyone dancing late into
the night. Not only was the food and music won-
derful, you would be amazed at how well some
judges can dance. There was also a chance for
judges spanning the United States and Canada to
share their experiences and problems. All of those
in attendance would agree that the conference
helped make them a better judge.
The AJA exists to help make its members better judges. One
of the ways it does this is through the annual educational con-
ference, but we do so much more. We are the leading institu-
tion in North America on the important issue of procedural
fairness. We will soon be offering a set of video-education  ses-
sions on this important issue. In addition, we have just pro-
duced six one-hour videos on judging and domestic violence
that are available to any AJA member without cost. You can find
a link to it on our website, www.amjudges.org. 
Speaking of our website, you should check it out. It is filled
with  information that will help you as a judge. Our website
hosts a lively and interesting blog (the AJA blog,
blog.amjudges.org). There are also past issues of the our jour-
nal, Court Review, where you can find articles about a broad
range of legal issues. Of course those of you reading this col-
umn don’t have to do that for the present issue—it’s in your
hands. Still, if you have missed or lost a past issue, it is there
for you.
The AJA is also your voice when it comes to important
issues affecting the judiciary. As your voice, the AJA issues
white papers that are the standing position of our organization.
These white papers issued in the name of our membership have
impacted the international discussion on judging. Our white
papers also can be found on the website.  
Currently, the AJA is taking a serious look at how we can
improve our organization to better help all of you. We are
thinking long-term about our structure and how
we can represent every judge in North America.
We will be working to strengthen the relation-
ship between Canadian and American judges,
looking to expand our membership, and think-
ing of ways to improve our already excellent
conferences. 
Our organization seeks to reach and to repre-
sent every judge. We want to be the voice for
every judge, but to do that we need your help.
We need an energetic membership, as sustaining a strong North
American judicial organization is not an easy task.
Come to our Midyear Conference in Fort Meyers, Florida, in
April and learn how to deal with the stress of being a judge. Or
plan to attend our Annual Educational Conference in Seattle,
Washington in September and join us for an in-depth discus-
sion about procedural fairness, among other issues. Send an
interesting tidbit to the AJA blog or offer to write a serious arti-
cle for Court Review.
Do more than be a member. Join one of the many AJA com-
mittees and share your thoughts about making us all better
judges. Think about running for the Board of Governors and
working to grow the AJA. Get involved, if in no other way then
by sending me an email with advice, asking me to share it with
the membership. Lend us your voice, to strengthen our voice in
the ongoing debate about role of judges. I hope you enjoy the
rest of this issue of Court Review and when you set it down, you
will take up the AJA.
President’s Column
A YEAR, A CHANGE, AND A CHALLENGE
Brian MacKenzie
Footnotes
1. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
2. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
3. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2483 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
4. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
5. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
6. Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2484 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 300 (1999)).
7. Id. at 2484-85.
8. Id. at 2485-87.
9. Id. at 2488-89.
10. Id. at 2490.
As in the past few years, most of the action in theSupreme Court’s 2013-2014 Term was on the civil sideof the docket. On the criminal side, the undisputed
blockbuster was Riley v. California,1 a seminal ruling about
searches of cell phones incident to arrest. Riley is significant for
several reasons, not the least of which is that it displays the jus-
tices’ understanding of new technologies (at last!) and their
recognition that cases involving today’s technologies are diffi-
cult to decide by simple reference to the brick-and-mortar
world. This article starts with Riley and other Fourth Amend-
ment decisions then moves to the Court’s Fifth, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendment rulings and to a smattering of federal crim-
inal and habeas cases. It concludes with a brief preview of the
2014-2015 Term. 
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Court issued an interesting assortment of Fourth
Amendment rulings last Term. Riley was the most significant
holding, though there were also important opinions addressing
traffic stops and anonymous tips, warrantless entries into the
home, and the use of deadly force during high-speed chases.
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES OF CELLULAR PHONES
Riley v. California, which was consolidated with United
States v. Wurie, involved the searches incident to arrest of two
cellular phones. In the first case, Riley was arrested following
a traffic stop. He had a “smart phone” in his pants pocket.
About two hours after the arrest, a detective examined the con-
tents of the phone. The detective found videos and pho-
tographs, which eventually connected Riley to a shooting. In
the second case, defendant Wurie was arrested for a suspected
drug sale. At the station house, officers seized a “flip phone,” a
now somewhat quaint form of technology, and noticed that the
phone was receiving calls from a source identified as “my
house.” Using the call log on the phone, officers identified the
defendant’s apartment. In a subsequent warrant search, police
seized narcotics, a firearm, and cash. The question in both
cases was whether law enforcement officers could obtain the
data from the cell phones without warrants. In a unanimous
decision, the Court held that warrants are required before
searching cell phones that are seized incident to arrests.
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion is a primer on the search-
incident-to-arrest doctrine, which is an exception to the war-
rant requirement. In Chimel v. California,2 the justices found
that officers who arrest a suspect inside a home may search the
area within the suspect’s immediate control but may not con-
duct a warrantless search of the remainder of the home. Such
an extensive search did not fit within the exception to the war-
rant requirement “because it was not needed to protect officer
safety or to preserve evidence.”3 Then in United States v. Robin-
son,4 the Court applied Chimel to uphold the search of a ciga-
rette pack on an arrestee’s person. Robinson categorically
approved the search without requiring any individualized
showing of need to protect officer safety or preserve evidence.
More recently, in Arizona v. Gant,5 the Court narrowed the
search-incident-to-arrest exception in the context of automo-
bile searches, holding that it authorizes a warrantless search
only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching dis-
tance of the passenger compartment or when it is reasonable to
believe that evidence relating to the crime of arrest is in the car.
Drawing on these cases and others, the Chief Justice derived
the general rule that exempting a type of search from the war-
rant requirement requires an assessment of “the degree to
which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and . . . the
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.”6 “[W]hile Robinson’s categorical rule
strikes the appropriate balance in the context of physical
objects,” that rule should not be extended to searches of digi-
tal content on cell phones.7
Officers are free to examine the physical aspects of a cell
phone to ensure that it cannot be used as a weapon. However,
digital data stored on a phone do not pose a risk to officers.
While there may be a risk of destruction of evidence, such as by
remote wiping, officers may take reasonable measures to mini-
mize the risk, such as turning off phones or placing them in
Faraday bags.8 On the other side of the balance, “cell phones, as
a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those impli-
cated by the search of a cigarette pack, wallet, or a purse.”9 The
Court recognized that many cell phones are more like mini-
computers with telephone capability. Phones collect distinct
types of information, such as addresses, notes, bank statements,
and videos, which may tell more in combination that any single
record. In addition, the whole of a person’s life can be recon-
structed through thousands of photographs labeled with dates,
locations, and descriptions, which is different than what may be
gleaned from a few photographs in a wallet. Phones are perva-
sive. “Prior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a
cache of sensitive personal information with them as they went
about their day.”10 And phones may also link to files stored in
the cloud. For these reasons and others, the Court found that a
Cell Phones and Everything Else:
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search in the case was supported by reasonable suspicion). 
17. See, e.g., Hedgepath v. Commonwealth, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 436 (Sept.
18, 2014) (search warrant expressly authorized seizure of cell
phones; though the warrant did not limit the parts of the cell
phone that could be searched or the files or data that were sought,
the clear thrust of the warrant was for evidence related to
assaults).
18. 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
19. 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014).
20. Id. at 1130.
21. Id. at 1133-34.
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24. Id. at 1137 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Thomas likewise
expressed his disagreement with Randolph. Id. at 1138 (Thomas,
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warrant is generally required before a search of a cell phone
seized incident to arrest.11 In so ruling, the justices rejected sev-
eral suggestions for a limited authority to search, such as per-
mitting searches of call logs only (as had occurred in Wurie) or
allowing searches of cell phone data if officers could have
obtained the same information from a pre-digital counterpart.
Although the case holds that a warrant is generally required
for a search of digital data on a cell phone, the Court was care-
ful to emphasize that other case-specific exceptions may still
justify a warrantless search in an individual case. The exigent-
circumstances exception could support, for example, a search
when a suspect is texting an accomplice about to detonate a
bomb, or a child abductor who has information on his cell
phone about the child’s location.12 The Court’s holding was
unanimous, although Justice Alito concurred to state his views
about the rationales for the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine
and to note that he would be willing to reconsider the question
in this case if legislatures assessed the needs of law enforce-
ment and the privacy interests of phone owners, and drew rea-
sonable distinctions based on categories of information or
other variables.13
Riley is an extremely significant ruling, as the Court itself rec-
ognized. But it has also spawned a number of questions that
courts will need to address. Will evidence be excluded in
searches that pre-date Riley?14 Does Riley generally prohibit war-
rantless searches of digital data in devices other than cellular
phones?15 Does the emphasis on the privacy interests in Riley
indicate that other types of searches of digital data will require
an individualized showing?16 What must be in a warrant autho-
rizing a search of a phone?17 I suspect that articles reviewing
future Terms of the Court will address some of these questions.
WARRANTLESS ENTRIES TO THE HOME—CONSENT
AND CURTILAGE
Officers have long been entitled to search a home, even a
jointly occupied home, if one of the residents consents. Eight
years ago, in Georgia v. Randolph,18 the Court held that a war-
rantless search of a shared dwelling—over the express refusal of
consent by a resident who is physically present—cannot be
deemed reasonable based upon
the consent of another resident.
The question in this Term’s case,
Fernandez v. California,19 was
whether the Randolph rule applied
when one resident granted con-
sent after a non-consenting resi-
dent was removed from the
premises. When officers came to
Fernandez’s door, he stated, “You
don’t have any right to come in
here. I know my rights.” He was
arrested because officers sus-
pected that he had assaulted his co-resident, who granted con-
sent to search an hour later.20 In a 6-3 opinion authored by Jus-
tice Alito, the Court distinguished Randolph and found that the
search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Characterizing Randolph as a “narrow exception” to the
general rule that a resident of a jointly occupied dwelling may
consent to search, the majority emphasized that the physical
presence of the objecting resident was essential to the holding
in Randolph.21 Fernandez was properly arrested, and “an occu-
pant who is absent due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in
the same shoes as an occupant who is absent for any other rea-
son.”22 The Court rejected the argument that Fernandez’s ear-
lier refusal to consent should have remained valid. First, the
argument is inconsistent with social expectations; visitors may
well decline to enter a home when one resident objects but
then return and enter when the objecting resident is not pre-
sent. Second, the argument raises practical concerns, such as
how long the objection remains effective, who is charged with
knowledge of the objection, and how a continuing objection
should be registered. Finally, denying the other resident the
power to consent would fail to honor his or her rights and
wishes.23 Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion but also
wrote separately to note his disagreement with the holding in
Randolph and to address an argument that Fernandez had a
right under property law to exclude police.24
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan,
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dissented. They saw the case as
a straightforward application of
Randolph. Fernandez was pre-
sent when he stated his objec-
tion to officers and, one hour
later, they “could scarcely have
forgotten” that he refused con-
sent.25 In their view, conjectures
about social expectations do not
shed light on the constitutional-
ity of the search, given the dis-
tinctions between private inter-
actions and police investiga-
tions. They also countered the
argument that applying Randolph to these facts would pose
practical problems. In their view, police could readily have
obtained a warrant and should have done so. The dissenters
“would honor the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement
and hold that Fernandez’s objection to the search did not
become null upon his arrest and removal from the scene.”26
Stanton v. Sims,27 a per curiam decision, is interesting
because it notes (but does not resolve) a Fourth Amendment
question that continues to split the courts. The Court in Stan-
ton found that an officer who entered the curtilage of a prop-
erty while pursuing a misdemeanor suspect was entitled to
qualified immunity in a civil-rights action. The justices
remarked that “federal and state courts nationwide are sharply
divided on the question whether an officer with probable cause
to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor may enter a home with-
out a warrant while in hot pursuit of that suspect.”28 Because
the law on this question was not clearly established, the Court
summarily reversed the court of appeals and found that the
officer should receive qualified immunity. 
TRAFFIC STOPS AND ANONYMOUS TIPS
Navarette v. California29 addressed the question whether a
somewhat spare anonymous tip provided reasonable suspicion
to support a traffic stop. A 911 caller reported that a pickup
truck had run her off the road. The caller provided a descrip-
tion of the truck, location, and plate number.30 An officer spot-
ted the vehicle shortly thereafter and followed it for about five
minutes before pulling it over. Navarette was the driver of the
truck, which contained marijuana. A closely divided Court
upheld the stop and thus the subsequent seizure.
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas noted that by report-
ing that she had been run off the road, the caller necessarily
claimed eyewitness knowledge of Navarette’s dangerous dri-
ving. This basis of knowledge distinguished the tip held to be
insufficient in Florida v. J.L.,31 where an anonymous caller sim-
ply reported that a young black male in a plaid shirt at a bus
stop was carrying a gun. In providing details about the pickup
truck and Navarette’s driving, the tip was closer to that upheld
in Alabama v. White.32 There, an anonymous tipster told police
that a woman would drive from a specific apartment building
to a hotel. The tipster described the vehicle and stated that the
woman would be transporting cocaine; officers were able to
corroborate the innocent details. The Navarette Court also
pointed out that the identification and tracing features of the
911 system provided additional justifications for reliance on
the call. After finding the tip to be sufficiently reliable, the jus-
tices concluded that “the behavior alleged by the 911 caller,
‘viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer, amount[s] to reasonable suspicion of drunk driving.’”33
In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Scalia (joined by Jus-
tices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) challenged the major-
ity’s conclusion that the tip was reliable as well as the inference
that the driver was intoxicated. The dissenters disagreed that
the information in the 911 call bore sufficient indicia of relia-
bility, particularly as the identity and location of the vehicle
were not based on intimate knowledge. “Unlike the situation
in White, that generally available knowledge in no way makes
it plausible that the tipster saw the car run someone off the
road.”34 Moreover, the caller did not assert that the driver was
drunk. At most, the call conveyed that the driver did some
apparently non-typical thing that forced the tipster from the
road. Finally, the officer who followed the truck for five min-
utes did not observe any traffic violations, which should have
discredited the claim that the driver was intoxicated. The dis-
senters suggested that the Court’s ruling will be taken to mean
that “[s]o long as the caller identifies where the car is, anony-
mous claims of a single instance of possibly careless or reckless
driving, called in to 911, will support a traffic stop.”35
DEADLY FORCE AND HIGH-SPEED PURSUITS
In Plumhoff v. Rickard,36 the justices considered whether offi-
cers could be liable for shooting and killing a suspect and pas-
senger during a high-speed car chase. An officer stopped
Rickard’s car for having only one headlight. When asked for his
license, Rickard sped away. Pursued by police, Rickard reached
speeds of over 100 miles an hour before eventually leaving the
highway and colliding with a police cruiser in a parking lot. Offi-
cers approached on foot, but Rickard continued to maneuver his
vehicle, and officers fired three shots into the car. When Rickard
managed to speed away again, the officers fired 12 more rounds.
Rickard and a passenger died from a combination of gunshot
wounds and injuries sustained during an ensuing crash.37 In a
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unanimous opinion by Justice Alito, the Court found that there
was no Fourth Amendment violation and that, in any event, the
officers would be entitled to qualified immunity from civil lia-
bility.38
With respect to the Fourth Amendment claim, the Court
first revisited Scott v. Harris,39 where the justices found that an
officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment by ending a car
chase with a technique that put the driver at risk of injury or
death. Here, as in Scott, “Rickard’s flight posed a grave public
safety risk,” and “the police acted reasonably in using deadly
force to end that risk.”40 Next, the Court rejected the claim that
even if deadly force was authorized, officers acted unreason-
ably in firing 15 shots, noting that “during the 10-second span
when all the shots were fired, Rickard never abandoned his
attempt to flee.”41
Finally, even had there been a Fourth Amendment violation,
officers would still be entitled to qualified immunity. In
Brosseau v. Haugen,42 the Court surveyed lower-court decisions
and held that an officer did not violate clearly established law
in firing at a fleeing vehicle to prevent harm to officers and cit-
izens in the area. Brosseau was not distinguishable on the facts.
Moreover, there was no showing that between the time of the
shooting in Brosseau (1999) and the events in this case (2004),
there had emerged either controlling authority or a robust con-
sensus of cases that would alter the analysis.43
FIFTH AMENDMENT
There were no police interrogation cases on the docket this
year, in contrast to other recent Terms, though the Court
issued a ruling on the privilege against compelled self-incrim-
ination in a different context. There were two additional Fifth
Amendment opinions: a per curiam decision reaffirming basic
principles of the Double Jeopardy Clause and an interesting
opinion about the role of the federal grand jury.
PRIVILEGE AGAINST COMPELLED 
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The self-incrimination case was Kansas v. Cheever,44 where a
defendant unsuccessfully argued that the Fifth Amendment
prohibited the State from rebutting defense testimony with an
expert who had previously examined the accused pursuant to
a court order. Cheever had at one point been charged with a
federal capital charge. He filed a notice that he intended to
introduce evidence relating to methamphetamine intoxication
with respect to his ability to form the specific intent required
for the charged crime, and the District Court ordered a psychi-
atric evaluation. The federal charge was subsequently dis-
missed, and Cheever was prosecuted in state court for the same
killing. At his trial, Cheever put forth a defense of voluntary
intoxication and introduced
expert evidence that his use of
methamphetamine had damaged
his brain. In rebuttal, the State
called the psychiatrist from the
federal case, who testified that
Cheever had shot the decedent
because of his antisocial person-
ality, not because his brain was
impaired from drug use. The jus-
tices unanimously rejected
Cheever’s Fifth Amendment
claim in an opinion authored by
Justice Sotomayor.
Cheever’s argument was based upon an inappropriately nar-
row reading of two prior decisions, Estelle v. Smith45 and
Buchanan v. Kentucky.46 In Smith, the use of a court-ordered
examination violated the Fifth Amendment where the defen-
dant neither initiated the examination nor put his mental
capacity at issue. The Buchanan Court had distinguished Smith
and allowed expert testimony because the defendant had intro-
duced an affirmative defense of extreme emotional distur-
bance, a mental-status defense. In this Term’s case, the justices
rejected Cheever’s claim that voluntary intoxication is not a
mental disease and hence that Buchanan would not apply.
Instead, the Court made clear that Buchanan sets forth a
broader rule: “where a defense expert who has examined the
defendant testifies that the defendant lacked the requisite men-
tal state to commit an offense, the prosecution may present
psychiatric evidence in rebuttal.”47 “Any other rule would
undermine the adversarial process.”48 Though the Court
rejected Cheever’s primary Fifth Amendment claim, the case
was remanded for the state courts to determine whether the
expert’s testimony exceeded the proper scope of rebuttal.49
In addition to Cheever, the justices decided another self-
incrimination case, White v. Woodall.50 But Woodall is more of a
ruling about the scope of federal habeas corpus than the Fifth
Amendment and is reviewed in the habeas part of this article.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The Double Jeopardy Clause case, Martinez v. Illinois,51 was
a straightforward reaffirmation of the rule that jeopardy
attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn. The defen-
dant’s trial was continued numerous times; several of the con-
tinuances were due to the State’s inability to locate key wit-
nesses. On the morning of trial, the prosecution participated in
jury selection and then again moved to continue the trial. The
motion was denied. The State told the judge it would not par-
ticipate in the trial, but the jury was sworn. When the prose-
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cution declined to call any wit-
nesses, the defendant’s motion for
a directed verdict of not guilty
was granted. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that Mar-
tinez was never placed in jeop-
ardy because the State had
declared—before the jury was
sworn—that it would not partici-
pate in the trial.52 The Supreme
Court summarily reversed, reject-
ing this “functional” approach to Double Jeopardy: “There are
few if any rules of criminal procedure clearer than the rule that
‘jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn.’”53
And because “the trial court’s action was an acquittal,” Mar-
tinez could not be retried.54
CHALLENGES TO THE GRAND JURY’S PROBABLE-
CAUSE DETERMINATION
Federal law permits a court to freeze the assets of an
indicted defendant if the assets could be forfeited upon con-
viction. In United States v. Monsanto,55 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of such an order so long as it is based upon a
finding of probable cause to believe that the property will ulti-
mately be subject to forfeiture. As the justices explained in the
most recent decision, Kaley v. United States,56 that finding has
two components. There must be probable cause to believe “(1)
that the defendant has committed an offense permitting forfei-
ture, and (2) that the property at issue has the requisite con-
nection to that crime.”57 The Kaleys were indicted in federal
court for transporting stolen medical devices and money laun-
dering, and the government obtained an order freezing certain
assets, including a certificate of deposit that the defendants
sought to use to pay their lawyer. They sought a hearing to
challenge the first part of the grand jury’s determination—that
there was probable cause to support the charges themselves. In
a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Kagan, the Court found that
the issue raised by the Kaleys “has a ready answer, because a
fundamental and historic commitment of our criminal justice
system is to entrust those probable cause findings to grand
juries.”58
The majority opinion stands as a strong statement about the
role of the federal grand jury. There is “no ‘authority for look-
ing into and revising the judgment of the grand jury upon the
evidence, for the purpose of determining whether or not the
finding was founded upon sufficient proof.’”59 “The grand jury
gets to say—without any review, oversight, or second-guess-
ing—whether probable cause exists to think that a person com-
mitted a crime.”60 We rely upon grand jury determinations to
justify other significant decisions, such as depriving suspects of
their freedom. And, said the Court, allowing a judicial chal-
lenge to the grand jury’s probable-cause determination may
“have strange and destructive consequences,” such as pitting a
judge against a grand jury on whether there is probable cause.61
The majority also rejected the defendants’ claim that they
were entitled to a hearing under the Due Process Clause bal-
ancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge.62 While the Court did not
reach the question of whether Mathews applies,63 the justices
concluded that even if it did apply, the defendants would not
be entitled to a hearing.64 The government has a substantial
interest in seizing forfeitable assets without a hearing. While
the Kaleys have a vital interest in retaining counsel of their
choice, an asset freeze resulting in the deprivation of counsel
of choice is only erroneous when unsupported by a finding of
probable cause. The Court’s analysis therefore turned on the
probable value of a judicial hearing to uncover a mistaken
finding of probable cause. They concluded that a judicial hear-
ing would provide “little benefit” because the probable-cause
determination “is not a high bar.”65
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer and
Sotomayor, wrote a forceful dissent, emphasizing the impor-
tance of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.66 The Chief
Justice did not consider a hearing on the seizure to be “mere
relitigation of the grand jury proceedings.”67 “The judge’s
decision based on the evidence presented at the hearing
would have no necessary legal or logical consequence for the
underlying prosecution because it would be based on different
evidence and used for a different purpose.”68 If the judge sides
with the defendants, he will simply hold that the prosecution
has not met its burden at that hearing to justify freezing their
assets. “The Government may proceed with the prosecution,
but the Kaleys will have their chosen counsel at their side.”69
The dissenters were also not persuaded by the majority’s
Mathews analysis.70 They concluded that the government’s
concerns were exaggerated, the value of additional proceed-
ings was significant, and the issues “implicate some of the
most fundamental precepts underlying the American criminal
justice system.”71
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SIXTH AMENDMENT
Hinton v. Alabama72 provided the justices with an opportu-
nity to apply the performance prong of Strickland v. Washing-
ton73 to an attorney error that led counsel to select an unqual-
ified defense expert. Hinton was suspected of killing two
restaurant managers during two separate robberies. After being
identified as a suspect in a third (non-fatal) robbery, officers
arrested Hinton and recovered a .38 caliber revolver. The
State’s experts concluded that bullets fired in all three robberies
came from the same gun. Hinton was charged with two counts
of capital murder. The State’s case turned on whether its
experts could convince the jury that all of the bullets came
from the .38. Hinton’s lawyer knew he needed a firearms and
toolmark examiner. He asked the trial court for funds for an
expert, and the court initially authorized up to $1,000, mis-
takenly believing that that was the limit under state law. In
fact, the applicable statute had been amended to permit a
request for any reasonable expenses. But counsel did not know
that either. He hired the best expert he could find for the
money, even though he knew that his expert was not suffi-
ciently qualified. The defense expert was discredited at trial,
and Hinton was convicted. In a post-conviction proceeding,
Hinton’s lawyer presented evidence from three well-qualified
experts. All three said that they could not conclude that the
bullets were fired from Hinton’s gun. In a per curiam opinion,
the Court summarily reversed the state courts’ denial of relief.
Under the first prong of Strickland, “it was unreasonable for
Hinton’s lawyer to fail to seek additional funds to hire an expert
where that failure was based not on any strategic choice but on
a mistaken belief that available funding was capped at
$1,000.”74 The “attorney’s ignorance of a point of law that is
fundamental to his case combined with his failure to perform
basic research on that point [was] a quintessential example of
unreasonable performance under Strickland.”75 This was not a
case about the “hiring of an expert who, though qualified, was
not qualified enough.”76 Rather, the failure was in not under-
standing the resources that state law made available to counsel,
leading him to select an expert that he himself deemed unqual-
ified. The Court remanded for the state courts to assess whether
this deficient performance was prejudicial under the second
prong of Strickland. “[I]f there is a reasonable probability that
Hinton’s attorney would have hired an expert who would have
instilled in the jury a reasonable doubt as to Hinton’s guilt had
the attorney known that the statutory funding limit had been
lifted,” Hinton would be entitled to a new trial.77
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
This Term’s case, Hall v. Florida,78 is an important sequel to
Atkins v. Virginia,79 where the
Court held that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
the execution of individuals with
intellectual disabilities.80 The
Florida Supreme Court inter-
preted a state statute to require a
showing of an IQ of 70 or less to
establish an intellectual disability.
Florida judicial decisions establish
that someone who scores above 70
“does not have an intellectual dis-
ability and is barred from present-
ing other evidence that would
show his faculties are limited.”81
Hall, who was convicted and sen-
tenced to death, challenged the strict IQ cutoff. At a sentenc-
ing before Atkins, he introduced substantial evidence of dis-
ability, including school records and expert testimony. At a
post-Atkins hearing, he presented the results of nine IQ evalu-
ations over the course of 40 years, but for evidentiary reasons
the court excluded the two scores below 70. Applying the 70-
point threshold, Hall’s Atkins claim was rejected. The Supreme
Court reversed in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Kennedy. 
“This rigid rule,” the majority held, “creates an unaccept-
able risk that persons with intellectual disability will be exe-
cuted, and this is unconstitutional.”82 The Court first assessed
how Florida’s rule comports with medical practices and under-
standings. The medical community defines intellectual disabil-
ity by three criteria: “significantly subaverage intellectual func-
tioning, deficits in adaptive functioning . . . , and onset of these
deficits during the development period.”83 Florida’s rigid rule
contravenes established medical practice in two respects: it
treats an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of intellec-
tual disability when experts would consider other evidence as
well, and it relies on the single numerical score while not rec-
ognizing that the score is imprecise. With respect to the latter
point, the Florida statute defines “significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning” as performance that is two or more
standard deviations from the mean on a standardized intelli-
gence test; with the mean IQ test score of 100, two or more
standard deviations from the mean would be a score of approx-
imately 70 points. However, each IQ test also has a “standard
error of measurement,” or “SEM,” reflecting “the inherent
imprecision of the test itself.”84 The SEM means that a person’s
score is best understood as a range. For example, a score of 71
is considered to reflect a range of 66 to 76 with 95% confidence
and a range of 68.5 to 73.5 with 68% confidence.85 Florida’s
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strict cutoff of 70 does not take
the SEM into account.
The Court then turned to
practices in other states and
found that “[a] significant major-
ity . . . implement the protections
of Atkins by taking the SEM into
account.”86 After reviewing legis-
lation in the various states and
the courts’ interpretation of these
statutes, as well as post-Atkins legislation to abolish the death
penalty altogether, the justices concluded that “every state leg-
islature to have considered the issue after Atkins—save Vir-
ginia’s—and whose law has been interpreted by its courts has
taken a position contrary to that of Florida.”87 Taking into
account the actions of the states, the justices’ own independent
judgment, and the views of medical experts, the Court found
Florida’s strict cutoff unconstitutional. “This Court agrees with
the medical experts that when a defendant’s IQ test score falls
within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error,
the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of
intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive
deficits.”88
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia and Thomas, dissented. They disagreed with the major-
ity’s analytical framework. To assess “the ‘evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of the maturing society,’” one
looks to “the standards of American society as a whole” and not
“the evolving standards of professional societies.” 89 The dis-
senters emphasized that state legislation provides the clearest
evidence of contemporary values. Of the states that impose the
death penalty, they counted 10 as not requiring the SEM to be
taken into account, 12 that consider the SEM, and 9 that have
not taken a definitive position. “These statistics cannot be
regarded as establishing a national consensus against Florida’s
approach.”90 Justice Alito disagreed with the Court’s analysis of
the SEM and also concluded that Florida does in fact account
for the SEM by permitting defendants to introduce multiple
test scores.91 The dissenters were especially critical of the
majority’s reliance on the views of professional organizations.
They raised a number of concerns, including that “the Court’s
approach implicitly calls upon the Judiciary either to follow
every new change in the thinking of these professional organi-
zations or to judge the validity of each new change.”92
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
As usual, the Term included a number of decisions constru-
ing the reach of federal criminal statutes. Two decisions—Bur-
rage v. United States93 and Rosemond v. United States94—are
interesting primers on fundamental aspects of criminal liabil-
ity. This section of the article reviews these opinions in some
detail and then briefly summarizes the holdings in a few other
cases.
The issue in Burrage was actual causation. Marcus Burrage
sold heroin to Joshua Banka, a long-time drug user. Banka died
after a night in which he used the heroin plus a host of other
drugs. Burrage was charged with drug distribution under a
provision containing a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence
when “death or serious bodily injury results from the use” of
the controlled substance. At trial, medical experts testified that
the heroin was a contributing factor in Banka’s death, but they
could not say whether he would have lived had he not taken
the heroin. The statute does not define the term “results from.”
The Court held that “at least where use of the drug distributed
by the defendant is not an independently sufficient cause” of
the death or injury, “a defendant cannot be liable under the
penalty enhancement provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)
unless such use is a but-for cause of the death or injury.”95
Writing for the Court,96 Justice Scalia reviewed basic princi-
ples of actual causation. A statute providing for liability when
a thing “results” usually requires proof that the harm would
not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct.97 The
Model Penal Code also “reflects this traditional understand-
ing,” stating that conduct “‘is the cause of a result’ if ‘it is an
antecedent but for which the result in question would not have
occurred’” and this is “‘the minimum requirement for a finding
of causation when a crime is defined in terms of conduct caus-
ing a particular result.’”98 The justices were not persuaded to
adopt a different standard due to the difficulty of proving cau-
sation in drug-overdose deaths. While several states consider
an act or omission a cause-in-fact if it was a “substantial” or
“contributing” factor in producing a result, the Court declined
to adopt this interpretation of the statute.99 Congress could
have written the statute in these terms had it chosen to do so.
Moreover, in light of the rule of lenity, the Court “cannot give
the text a meaning that is different from its ordinary, accepted
meaning, and that disfavors the defendant.”100
Rosemond addressed the mental state required for aiding-
and-abetting liability. Rosemond was involved in a drug sale.
When a would-be purchaser ran away without paying, either
Rosemond or a co-felon fired a gun at him. Rosemond was
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charged under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) with using or carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime. He
was tried for the § 924(c) count under alternative theories:
either he was the shooter or he aided and abetted the shooter.
The case afforded the justices the opportunity to review the
scope of aiding-and-abetting liability. The majority ruled that a
defendant who does not know that a co-felon is bringing a gun
to a drug sale may not be convicted of aiding and abetting the
co-felon’s act of using or carrying the firearm. 
Justice Kagan’s opinion for the Court begins with the actus
reus of the offense. “The common law imposed aiding and
abetting liability on a person (possessing the requisite intent)
who facilitated any part—even though not every part—of a
criminal venture.”101 Rosemond’s participation in the drug deal
satisfied the affirmative-act requirement. But “an aiding and
abetting conviction requires not just an act facilitating one or
another element, but also a state of mind extending to the
entire crime.”102 The intent must reach beyond a simple drug
sale to an armed drug sale. “An intent to advance some differ-
ent or lesser offense is not, or at least not usually, sufficient:
Instead, the intent must go to the specific and entire crime
charged—so here, to the full scope (predicate crime plus gun
use) of § 924(c).”103 That intent will be satisfied when an
active participant in a drug transaction knows that a confeder-
ate will carry a gun. In that case, the accomplice has decided to
join in the venture with full awareness of its scope. However,
for that to be true, the accomplice must know of the firearm in
advance, so he can make the relevant legal and moral choice.
It must be “knowledge at a time the accomplice can do some-
thing with it—most notably, opt to walk away.”104 The Court
rejected Rosemond’s claim that liability should only attach if
an accomplice affirmatively wants a confederate to use a gun;
it is enough that the defendant has, with full knowledge, cho-
sen to participate in the scheme. 
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed with much
of the majority’s opinion but strongly disagreed with the con-
clusion that a conviction requires an aider and abettor to have
a realistic opportunity to refrain from engaging in the criminal
conduct. In his view, this rule represents an “unprecedented
alteration of the law of aiding and abetting and of the law of
intentionality generally.”105 He wrote that the majority con-
verted what was an affirmative defense into a part of the
required mens rea for the offense.
Two other decisions are worth noting. Paroline v. United
States,106 like Burrage, addresses causation, but in a narrower
context. The majority in Paroline held that a defendant con-
victed of possession of child pornography could be ordered to
pay restitution to the child
depicted in the photographs only
for those losses proximately
caused by the defendant’s offense
conduct. To determine the proper
amount of restitution, “a court
must assess as best it can from
available evidence the signifi-
cance of the individual defen-
dant’s conduct in light of the
broader causal process that pro-
duced the victim’s losses.”107 And
in Bond v. United States,108 the
Court found that the Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 does not
reach “a purely local crime: an amateur attempt by a jilted wife
to injure her husband’s lover” by spreading chemicals on a
mailbox, car door, and doorknob, “which ended up causing
only a minor thumb burn readily treated by rinsing with
water.”109 The majority construed the Act not to apply, insist-
ing “on a clear indication that Congress meant to reach purely
local crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive lan-
guage in a way that intrudes on the police power of the
States.”110 Three justices concurred in the judgment; they
would have gone further and found the application of the Act
unconstitutional.111
HABEAS CORPUS
In several recent Terms, the Court has emphasized the lim-
ited scope of federal habeas corpus review. The 2011-2012
Term, for example, was marked by six summary reversals of
lower-court decisions that had granted habeas corpus relief to
state inmates.112 There were two significant cases this Term,
White v. Woodall113 and Burt v. Titlow,114 that again underscored
the limited nature of federal habeas review.
Woodall pleaded guilty to capital charges. At his penalty-
phase trial, he called character witnesses but did not testify
himself. His lawyer asked the trial judge to instruct the jury
that the defendant is not compelled to testify and that he
should not be prejudiced by the decision not to testify. In a 6-
3 opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Woodall Court found
that while a previous case, Carter v. Kentucky,115 required a no-
adverse-inference instruction at the guilt phase, prior decisions
from the Supreme Court did not clearly establish such a right
at the penalty phase. Thus, the state court’s decision was not
“contrary” to clearly established federal law as determined by
the Supreme Court. Nor was the state court’s holding an unrea-
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sonable application of Supreme
Court precedent. To obtain
habeas relief on that ground, a
petitioner must show that the
state court’s ruling “was an error
well understood and compre-
hended in existing law beyond
any possibility for fair minded
disagreement.”116 There was no
such error here. “The appropriate
time to consider the question [of
an instruction at the penalty phase] as a matter of first impres-
sion would be on direct review, not in a habeas case governed
by [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d)(1).”117 Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor dissented, arguing that Carter and Estelle v. Smith118
together compelled a no-adverse-inference instruction at the
penalty phase of a capital trial.119
In Burt v. Titlow, the Sixth Circuit found that Titlow was
entitled to habeas corpus relief due to the ineffective assistance
of her second lawyer, who had advised her to withdraw her
guilty plea and go to trial. According to the Circuit, the state
court’s reason for finding no ineffective assistance—that the
withdrawal of the plea followed Titlow’s assertion of inno-
cence—was based upon an unreasonable interpretation of the
factual record. The Supreme Court disagreed, applying the
“doubly deferential” standard of review of an ineffective-assis-
tance-of-counsel claim on federal habeas corpus. In an opinion
by Justice Alito, the Court found that the record supported the
state court’s factual finding that the new lawyer advised with-
drawal of the plea only after a claim of innocence. After accept-
ing that factual determination, the Circuit’s ineffective-assis-
tance-of-counsel analysis could not be sustained. “Although a
defendant’s proclamation of innocence does not relieve coun-
sel of his normal responsibilities under Strickland [v. Washing-
ton], it may affect the advice counsel gives.”120 The state court’s
conclusion that the advice satisfied Strickland fell within the
bounds of reasonableness under the federal habeas corpus
statute.121
A LOOK AHEAD
So far, the October 2014 Term is a bit light on criminal
cases. But there are a few worth noting.
One well-publicized case, Elonis v. United States,122 arose
from the defendant’s postings on Facebook; the legal issue is
whether a conviction for threatening another person under 18
U.S.C. § 875(c) requires proof of the defendant’s subjective
intent to threaten. A Confrontation Clause case is on the
docket. The issue in Ohio v. Clark123 is whether a child’s state-
ments to a daycare teacher, who has a mandatory duty to
report suspected child abuse, are testimonial within the mean-
ing of the Confrontation Clause. Another significant case is
Rodriguez v. United States,124 which concerns whether an offi-
cer was lawfully entitled to extend an already-completed traf-
fic stop to bring in a narcotics-detection dog. The case may be
important if it generally addresses extensions to these stops.
Heien v. North Carolina,125 another traffic-stop case, asks
whether a stop violates the Fourth Amendment where the
police officer’s reasonable suspicion is based upon a mistaken
interpretation of law. Finally, Yates v. United States126 is—
hands-down—the most entertaining criminal-law case of the
Term thus far. There the issue is whether a defendant can be
prosecuted under the “anti-shredding” provisions of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act for throwing purportedly undersized grouper
from his commercial fishing boat to avoid being sanctioned for
catching undersized fish. Yes, fish. Grouper.
Fish or no fish, it will be an interesting Term.
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Footnotes
1. The concept of “high touch” vs. “high tech” is drawn from Mega-
trends by futurist John Naisbitt (Warner Books, 1982).
2. For example, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia. For information, see http://www.leclairryan.com/
files/Uploads/Documents/Rocket%20Docket%20EDVA%20
FAQ.pdf.
3. For example, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio. For information, see Local Rule 16.1 at
http://www.ohnd.uscourts.gov/assets/Rules_and_Orders/Local_Ci
vil_Rules/Rule161.pdf. 
4. For example, the presentment process in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. For information, see
Local Rule 5.3 at http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/_assets/_docu-
ments/Rules/LR2012.pdf. 
5. The trial tripwire can take many forms ranging from an early
deadline for all cases to set trial or prohibiting a trial setting until
the case is fully prepared and certified as ready for trial. For one
example, consider the trial-setting process in the state courts of
Colorado stated in Colo. R. Civ. Pro. 16(b)(4).
Most trends in reforming our civil litigation system inrecent decades have been based on a “high tech” par-adigm—reformers assume the system will be more
efficient if we create enough self-executing procedures that
issues are resolved automatically and people are kept away
from the courthouse. The paradigm is akin to an automated
system for answering the telephone at a busy company; just
push the right button and you will automatically be transferred
to your destination. This article suggests an alternative “high
touch” approach1 that applies the principles of procedural jus-
tice to achieve more efficient “distributive justice” (a fair and
just result). The testing experience of a seven-year pilot pro-
gram and the behavioral science research underlying proce-
dural justice are consistent with the following thesis: A civil
case management system should achieve greater efficiency,
participant cooperation, and participant satisfaction by
eschewing the modern trend of dispute suppression and pre-
fab case management in favor of a philosophy that, informed
by the behavioral sciences, is based on disputant engagement
that tailors case management to the individual needs of the
case. Put more succinctly, effective civil case management is
tailored to the individual needs of the participants. While a
controlled evaluative study is needed, the pilot testing and the
existing behavioral science research tell us that the goal of civil
case management should be giving each civil case the degree of
management it needs (whether greater or lesser) through early,
hands-on, and individualized engagement of the judge with
the disputants. To continue the telephone analogy, rather than
an automated telephone-answering system, a live, knowledge-
able, and engaged receptionist will be more effective for the
company and the customer, more satisfying for the customer,
and more economical and efficient for all.
Civil litigators, parties, and judges have long been dissatis-
fied with civil case management. In 2006, a group of experi-
enced civil litigators and trial court judges assembled to launch
an experiment in civil case management. Our goals were mod-
est. We did not have the ability to change the existing rules of
civil procedure, so we sought to work within them. Our col-
lective instinct was that the trend of rule-based, automated
management of civil litigation impaired rather than improved
the delivery of distributive justice. We also suspected that the
automation approach exacerbated rather than resolved the
problems in civil litigation. We wanted to make the path to dis-
pute resolution more efficient and trim away the most com-
mon distractions to let everyone involved focus their resources
on the core of the civil dispute. Our suspicion was that a “high
touch” approach of active and engaged case management
would be more effective. We started a pilot as a test bed for
experimenting with different techniques.
What we learned was that this modest goal leads to revolu-
tionary realizations in civil case management. The lessons we
learned reduced one participating judge’s civil caseload by
58%. While a more rigorous quantitative study involving con-
trol groups is needed, this bespoke approach appeared to
reduce substantially the judge-time required per case—reaping
the double benefit of a lower caseload as well as less time
required per case.
We started our project by surveying the various procedural
approaches used around the country to improve civil case
management. We looked at the rocket docket,2 differential case
management,3 motions dockets,4 trial-setting tripwire,5 and
many others. Fortunately, we had reflective people with real-
world experience in each of the approaches that could assess
firsthand the benefits and shortcomings of these approaches.
We quickly realized we were trying to start our journey from
the destination. We took a conventional step back and asked
what drives the problems in civil litigation. We realized this
was also too myopic. We stepped back further and asked what
drives civil litigation. Once we answered that question, a new
approach revealed itself. However, we then had to start our
experiment to realize that the true foundation lay in asking
what drives human behavior. Over time, the pilot project
revealed that the solution to the problems in civil case man-
agement lay, not in defining specific procedures, but in adopt-
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A New Model for 
Civil Case Management:
Efficacy Through Intrinsic Engagement
David Prince
6. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United
States, 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-7.
ing a new philosophy of civil case management by pursuing
individualized engagement based on what academics call an
“intrinsic motivation” model.
The key building blocks to achieving both efficient and
effective case management define a philosophy of civil case
management. These three foundational blocks can be summa-
rized as follows:
• Procedural Justice Matters—How One Charts the Course Is
as Important as the Course
• The Verdict Is Not the Goal—One Must Determine the Des-
tination to Chart the Course
• The Lawyer Is the Judge’s Ally—Work with the Crew, Not
Against Them
A philosophy built on these three principles, in turn, leads to
four core strategies:
• Bring ’Em In and Engage, Engage, Engage
• Ask Why
• Streamline and Customize Case Management
• Engage Disputes to Eliminate Distractions
Implementation tactics for an individual judge will then be dri-
ven by a combination of these principles, the local legal cul-
ture, and the judge’s skills and experience. 
This philosophy and these strategies evolved over time
through the test bed of the pilot. But as the individualized-
engagement model evolved, anecdotal observations indicated it
was remarkably more successful than the mainstream model of
remote rule-based case management. A review of the latest
research from the world of the behavioral sciences explained and
confirmed the anecdotal observations and apparent results
achieved in the pilot’s field experiments. The ultimate proposal
of this article is that future civil-case-management reform should
follow the paths pioneered in the problem-solving courts; specif-
ically, it should be informed by, and based upon, the empirical
data now available explaining human behavior and motivation.
Section II of this article will provide the reader with a brief
overview of behavioral and management research advances rel-
evant to civil case management. Then, we will examine the pri-
mary existing model for civil case management with the aid of
this research and the reader’s experience with the mainstream
existing model. If the idea of reading about behavioral science
research is too soft and fuzzy, skip to sections III and IV. There,
this article will propose a new model to inform future civil case
management based on this research and, more importantly,
real-world experiences. After discussing the philosophies and
strategies of a new engagement-based model for civil case man-
agement, this article will delve into the nuts and bolts of imple-
mentation tactics through a case example in section V. Section
VI then provides some thoughts on a path forward.
By the conclusion, you will know the strategies necessary to
revolutionize your approach to civil case management. Instead
of devoting your time to litigating the litigation, you will be
able to clear away the distractions and focus your time on pro-
viding effective, productive court services to the parties. You
can focus the bulk of your judi-
cial civil time and attention on
the meaty analyses requiring a
judge rather than on the end-
less review of briefing on dis-
tracting issues. The lawyers in
your case will also be able to
streamline their work. In the
end, your approach to civil case
management will yield more
effective, more efficient, and
more satisfying solutions to your community.
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENTS IN 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE
A. JUDGES AS PROJECT MANAGERS
In 1986, the Administrative Conference of the United States
adopted recommendations for addressing perceived problems
in our litigation procedures. The adjudication process was
believed to suffer from delays, excessive expense, and unpro-
ductive legal maneuvering. This, in turn, was seen as interfer-
ing with achieving substantive justice. The Conference called
for judges to take away from the lawyer control of case man-
agement. The Conference noted that “many judges, informed
scholars and other experienced observers now cite lawyer con-
trol of the pace and scope of most cases as a major impedi-
ment” to the litigation process.6
Moving a civil dispute through the litigation process to con-
clusion is an exercise in project management. The mid-twenti-
eth-century view of the litigation process assigned the judge a
passive role, if any, in that project management. The judge’s
role was to provide fair and impartial decisions of disputes
(distributive justice) brought to the judge, and little else. As
indicated by the Conference report, a major shift began several
decades ago when the judge was increasingly expected to pro-
vide active management of the litigation. As the Conference
observed in 1986, “[i]n the federal judicial sphere, and increas-
ingly in the state judiciary, a consensus is developing that effi-
cient case management is part of the judicial function, on par
with the traditional duties of offering a fair hearing and a wise,
impartial decision.” Once the judge was assigned the role of
project manager, a managerial philosophy had to be selected.
Project management challenges the manager to move a
group of people to accomplish a goal. In addition to identify-
ing the tasks required, project management requires influenc-
ing behavior, gaining compliance, and achieving acceptance of
the manager’s authority. How one approaches these tasks is
based on the managerial philosophy of the manager.
B. TWO MODELS OF MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY
Those who study management and human behavior tend to
identify two broad types of managerial philosophy or manage-
ment models. The language varies by author, but they often
differentiate between a traditional management model of
extrinsic command and control and an emerging model of
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autonomy or intrinsic motiva-
tion. In the context of analyz-
ing civil case management,
the traditional command-and-
control or “extrinsic” model
would describe a model of
civil case management based
on automated and self-execut-
ing generic case-management
rules. The judge’s role in the
extrinsic model is to drive the
participants through the rule-defined path and enforce those
rules through sanctions. The model of autonomy or “intrinsic”
motivation would describe the individualized-engagement
model advocated in this article.
Two sample authors in these fields that are accessible to a
law-trained audience are Tom R. Tyler and Daniel H. Pink.
Tyler is closely connected to the field of law, while Pink’s rele-
vant work focuses on business management.
Tom Tyler is the founder and leading exponent of the pro-
cedural-justice movement. He is a psychologist who has spent
more than two decades studying the question: Why do people
obey the law? In his work, Psychology and the Design of Legal
Institutions, Tyler explains our two models in the context of
designing credible and effective systems of law.
Tyler describes the traditional model as one based on “social
control” of human behavior through use of extrinsic rules that
create a system of punishments and rewards for compliance
with those rules.7 He often refers to this as a “deterrence”-
based model for directing the behavior of individuals.8 He
observes that this model is heavily dependent on an extensive
system that allows leaders to monitor or surveil the behavior
of individuals to distribute proper rewards and punishments
based on rule compliance.9 This surveillance component is a
necessary foundation for an extrinsic system because the suc-
cess of a deterrence model is largely dependent on the individ-
ual’s belief that he or she is likely to be caught and punished
for breaking the rules.10 For example, I sit at the red light with-
out moving because I expect something bad will happen if I
run the light. Through a review of the existing research, Tyler
demonstrates that the deterrence model is ultimately resource
intensive and relatively ineffective in securing individual com-
pliance and cooperation.11 If there is no traffic around, I do not
expect to be caught, and the light is particularly long, I may
run the red light.
Tyler explains that the social-control model’s reliance on
punishment for violating rules results in participants being less
likely to follow the rules when they are not under surveillance.
The control model “create[s] an adversarial relationship,”
which leads the participants “to grow less compliant” with the
rules and “less willing to help” (i.e., less cooperative).12 As the
rules under a control model are simply imposed on the partic-
ipants without their input or consent, the participants also see
those rules as lacking legitimacy.13 This, in turn, contributes to
a reduction in compliance. Any young associate that has had to
face an experienced and obstreperous opponent “alone” in the
confines of a telephone conference to negotiate a deposition
date or document production will recognize Tyler’s academic
explanation of the experience. Tyler concludes that the deter-
rence model “is a very high cost strategy [because of the imple-
mentation and policing resources required] that yields identi-
fiable, but weak, results.”14
Tyler describes the second model as one based on “legiti-
macy and morality.”15 By “legitimacy,” he means a system that
strives to win the consent, compliance, and cooperation of the
participants through involvement. By doing so, the
leader/manager gains authorization from the participants to
lead and make decisions. “Legitimacy, therefore, is a quality
possessed by an [individual], a law, or an institution that leads
others to feel obligated to obey its decisions and directives.”16
By “morality,” Tyler means that the standards or rules gov-
erning conduct are internalized by the participants as private
values—as their own feelings of responsibility and obliga-
tion.17 Once this internalization is achieved, the participants
self-regulate to comply with those standards.18
If I understand and accept that my community has decided
that we should have a traffic light at this intersection because
it is a dangerous blind curve and a fast heavy truck could be
coming at any moment without warning, I accept the rule that
we must stop when the light is red. I internalize this rule and
believe honoring it is part of being responsible. I tend to honor
the requirement to stop even when it makes me late and I can-
not see a reason to stop on this particular night. As a result, I
am more likely to stay stopped at the red light even if I am sure
I will not get ticketed for running it and doubt I would get hit
if I ran the light this time. Tyler explains: 
Self-regulation can occur based upon legitimacy, morality,
and/or both.
The police and courts, as an example, depend heavily
upon the widespread voluntary compliance of most of the
citizens most of the time. This compliance presumably
allows authorities to focus their attention upon those
individuals and groups whose behavior seems to be
responsive only to threats of punishment. The legal sys-
tem would be overwhelmed immediately if it were
required to regulate the behavior of the majority of citi-
zens solely through sanctioning or the threat of sanction-
ing.19
Morality and legitimacy are achieved, Tyler argues from the
research, through following the precepts of procedural justice.
176 Court Review - Volume 50  
Tom Tyler . . . has
spent more than
two decades
studying the 
question: Why do
people obey 
the law?
20. Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Justice: A Key Ingredient in
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The key dimensions of procedural justice are as follows:20
• Voice: The participant must feel heard in the proceedings;
• Neutrality: Decision-making must appear unbiased and
principled;
• Respect: The participant must believe he or she was treated
with dignity;
• Trust: The participant must believe the decision-maker is
taking into account the participant’s needs and sincerely
trying to address the litigants’ needs.  The label “trust” for
this parameter can be a miscue to one with a law degree.
One researcher has referred to this parameter more descrip-
tively as “helpfulness” rather than “trust.”21
Even Tyler’s elements of procedural justice can be boiled
down to the simple ideas that a person will be more satisfied
and likely to cooperate with decisions made by an authority if
that person believes the decision was fair. The research tells us
that the single most important factor in determining whether
the person believes the decision was fair is not the decision
itself. Instead, it is whether the person believes he or she had a
chance to speak and be heard in the decision process.22
Interesting research by Lind, Kanfer, and Earley examined
this point.23 The researchers used the scenario of giving work
assignments to personnel. Participants were given three
approaches to handing out work assignments. In the first sce-
nario, the participant was simply given an assignment. In the
second scenario, the participant was told of a tentative sched-
ule and then asked for feedback. The schedule was then
adjusted to come closer to that proposed by the participant. In
the third scenario, the researcher handed out the work sched-
ule and stated it would not be changed. However, the
researcher then asked for opinions from the participants. After
receiving the opinions, the researcher stayed with the initial
assignments. Predictably, the scenario in which participants
were allowed to provide their input before the decision was
made was viewed as the fairest (which, in turn, means it was
the most likely to be followed). The surprising result for many
is the perception of fairness for the third scenario, in which
participants were told the schedule would not be changed,
were then given a chance to provide input only after the deci-
sion was made, and then basically had all their input rejected
when the researcher confirmed the original decision. This
third scenario was still viewed as substantially fairer than the
first, when no “voice” was permitted. Thus, even an admittedly
“sham” opportunity to provide input makes a person substan-
tially more likely to follow rules and procedures than simply
imposing them on the person with no chance to speak.
In summary, Tyler concludes that a rule-making system
(which is analogous for our purposes to a system for manage-
ment of a civil lawsuit) is dramati-
cally more likely to achieve accep-
tance, compliance, and efficiency
through cooperation by using a fair
system to allow the individuals
being ruled (the disputants in our
analogy) to participate in shaping
those rules so that they will inter-
nalize the standards as their own.
Tyler’s 2006 research reveals that an
individual’s belief in the legitimacy
of the rules at issue is five times
more important to their decision whether to follow those rules
than their perceived risk of punishment for breaking them.24 His
research further reveals that what he calls the “morality” factor
is 15 times as important to compliance as the risk factor.25
Our second author is Daniel Pink. He is a respected writer
on issues of interest to the business world such as organiza-
tional management. In his 2009 book Drive: The Surprising
Truth About What Motivates Us, he labels the two management-
philosophy models as Motivation 2.0 based on Type X behav-
ior and Motivation 3.0 based on Type I behavior. For simplic-
ity, this article will refer to Type X (think “X” for “extrinsic”)
and Type I (think “I” for “intrinsic”). Pink draws a now-famil-
iar distinction between the models. “Type X behavior is fueled
more by extrinsic desires than intrinsic ones. . . . Type I behav-
ior is fueled more by intrinsic desires than extrinsic ones.”26
Type X is the traditional model of management that has
dominated business management for a century. In business
management, Type X assumes that people will not do their
work unless closely controlled, monitored, and driven by their
manager. It assumes that employees are motivated through a
system of providing rewards for desirable behavior and pun-
ishments for undesirable. Simply put, Type X-based manage-
ment seeks to define the path for the employee to follow in
detail and then rewards desirable behavior and punishes unde-
sirable behavior to achieve a smooth-functioning employee
“machine.”27 Advanced research on Type X-based management
explains that rewards are substantially more effective than
punishments in achieving results.28 Type X-based management
is an alternative description of the same “extrinsic motivation”
principles described by Tyler as a “social control” or “deter-
rent” model.
A classic example of Type X-based management is a tradi-
tional twentieth-century manufacturing assembly line. The
employee is placed at a station on a factory floor overlooked by
a manager’s window. The employee is given detailed instruc-
tions based on a time-and-motion study of exactly how to insert
tab A into slot B. The employee must conform strictly to
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requirements defining when
she arrives, what she wears,
when she can take a bathroom
break, when she can speak,
etc., to allow the assembly line
to move rapidly and consis-
tently. The employee has given
no input into any of this and no
explanation of why the third
finger on her left hand must be
held at such and such an angle.
The employee is always under
observation, and every devia-
tion from the defined path is
sanctioned.
Like Tyler in reviewing research on the rule of law, Pink
reviews the available research from the fields of business man-
agement and behavior. He concludes that Type X-based man-
agement is generally unsuccessful for most modern business
environments and can make employees underachievers, as
well as more likely to pursue unethical behavior.29
One of Pink’s more intriguing findings is that paying
bonuses for meeting specified goals actually harms the perfor-
mance of an employee or group of employees over time when
they perform work that requires more than rote repetition of
defined steps.30 This finding was based on pioneering research
by Harlow and Deci.31 Deci pursued a research model testing
different ways of getting people to form various patterns with
certain puzzle-like pieces. He divided them into two groups:
one that was paid based on their level of performance and one
that was not paid. He had the two groups assemble certain pat-
terns over a three-day period. He ultimately found that the
unpaid group performed markedly better than the paid group.
Pink’s Type I model explains why.
In a related finding, Pink concludes that goals imposed on
people are frequently deleterious, while goals the person helps
to set for his or her own reasons can be remarkably effective.32
In short, he concludes that Type X-based management applied
to any situation comparable to the tasks of civil litigation is
counterproductive. 
Pink explains Type I-based management as relying on the
employee’s own intrinsic motivations to achieve the manager’s
desired results.33 While he uses different language, his expla-
nation of the research on this form of management is remark-
ably similar to Tyler’s procedural-justice concept. Pink identi-
fies three elements of Type I-based management: autonomy,
mastery, and purpose.34
Pink explains that the human being’s natural state is to be
autonomous and self-directed. Consequently, the more
autonomous and self-directed a person can be, the more pro-
ductive the person will be. While a manager must ultimately
direct the goal for the benefit of the organization, the employ-
ees should retain as much autonomy as possible over what
they do, how they do it, and when they do it.35 As in the work-
load research regarding voice by Lind, Kanfer, and Earley, that
automony can be minimal: it may be as little as an opportunity
to be heard on the rules and production targets being set.
For his second element, Pink explains that motivating an
employee most effectively requires a manager to recognize the
individual’s desire to be fully engaged. Human beings need to
feel that they are making progress in their work. This feeling is
a substantial motivator. Pink refers to this feeling of progress
as “mastery.”36 People want to feel that they are honing their
own skills. 
In the context of civil case management, mastery may be
served by giving the lawyers the chance to explain and, when
appropriate, try their ideas on how best to take the case to con-
clusion. I once had one of those dozen-lawyer initial case-man-
agement conferences in a mechanics-lien case. One lawyer
stepped forward to explain a system they had used in another
case for streamlining the claims process and some suggested
refinements. The other lawyers found the ideas intriguing. We
discussed the process and implemented it for our case. Viewed
through Pink’s lens, this was a courtroom version of working
with the participants’ needs for mastery. More commonly, mas-
tery for us will merge into the other two of Pink’s elements.
Even the example given could also be characterized as serving
autonomy or purpose. 
For his final element, Pink states that “[h]umans, by their
nature, seek purpose—to make a contribution and to be part of
a cause greater and more enduring than themselves.”37 Despite
the high-sounding language, the “purpose” need not be to save
the world; “purpose” need be only something beyond the indi-
vidual’s personal interest. For our purposes, “purpose” can be
seen simply as involving the participants in defining the goals
for the litigation and the steps in its management. The element
can be served by discussing why any particular procedure,
deadline, or page limit has been set where it is in this particu-
lar case (for example, “We set the deadline for supplementing
disclosures on this date because of the parties’ respective
accounting cycles and the need to accommodate the account-
ing experts’ tax-season schedules.”). 
One study reviewed by Pink illustrates the concept of “pur-
pose.”38 He notes that one of the most underutilized words in
management is “why.” Adam Grant, a University of Pennsylva-
nia psychologist, researched call-center employees—not the
first group of employees that comes to mind when one thinks
of jobs with a higher “purpose.” He divided the employees into
two groups. One group worked as normal. The other group
read articles about the benefits and overall value of the work
they would be doing. The group given a “purpose” for their
work performed substantially better than the other group.39
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To return to the assembly-line analogy, recall the American
automotive industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s. That
factory floor was effectively the example of extrinsic manage-
ment previously described and had been since Henry Ford per-
fected it. By the 1980s, there was considerable discussion of
changing management philosophies in the American automo-
tive factory to mimic those in a Japanese automotive factory.
The “revolutionary” changes were to engage the line workers
in discussions of how the assembly line was organized and the
sequencing of the work and to get their input on the best ways
for them to do their work. Managers were to have line workers
identify ways each could better contribute to the final product.
They were to treat each employee as a highly skilled master at
their task rather than a disposable cog. Managers were to focus
everyone on the need for high-quality work to keep the factory
in business as well as the need for line workers to provide a
product in which they could take pride. A key symbolic act
was authorizing any person on the factory floor to halt the
assembly line to fix a problem. Viewed through the prism of
Pink’s paradigm, these developments all focused on Type I
motivation, serving the worker’s need for autonomy, mastery,
and purpose.
In considering Pink’s discussion of “purpose” and Tyler’s
discussion of “voice,” I am reminded of the Continental Army
drillmaster “Baron” von Steuben, who famously complained
about American soldiers:
You say [to a Prussian soldier], “Do this” and he does it,
but [in America] I have to say, “This is why you ought to
do that,” and then [the American soldier] does it.40
The Baron, despite deriding it, was actually far ahead of his
time in management philosophy.
While each approaches the issues from a different perspec-
tive, Tyler and Pink reach the same conclusion after reviewing
extensive research into human behavior. Both conclude that,
whether designing a legal system or a management system, one
will achieve substantially more efficient, effective, and reward-
ing results by designing the system based on intrinsic rather
than extrinsic motivation. 
C. THE TWO MODELS APPLIED TO CIVIL CASE 
MANAGEMENT
1. Extrinsic-Model Civil Case Management 
Decades have passed since the Administrative Conference
of the United States observed that our litigation systems suf-
fered from widespread dissatisfaction and procedural problems
that were ultimately impeding the judiciary’s core function of
delivering just results. The primary recommendation of the
Conference was for the judiciary to undertake the role of pro-
ject manager to move litigation through to conclusion.
Court systems have largely accepted this new obligation to
be project managers. In civil litigation, court systems have gen-
erally approached this task by adopting rules aimed at creating
a more defined path for civil litigation. Rules adopted at the
jurisdiction level and at the local level set timelines for each
phase of litigation. Generic deadlines were established for fil-
ing briefs, as were standard-
ized page limits. In the 1990s,
perceived abuses of discovery
were addressed with limits on
the number of the various dis-
covery tools that could be
used. Also, affirmative-disclo-
sure rules were added to move
the cases down the path. Later,
codes of prohibited deposition
conduct were developed. Some
of these codes managed the
very words to be spoken dur-
ing the deposition at certain
points of conflict. Limits were
placed on the numbers and
length of depositions. Some
courts set prerequisites to set-
ting trial dates. Others set aggressive trial dates and then
applied a formula to set other deadlines based on that trial
date. A system of sanctions for straying from the defined liti-
gation path has also evolved over time. Development of Rule
11 was the initial approach. The affirmative-disclosure model
was accompanied by a prohibition (which evolved to be rather
porous) on use at trial of information not timely disclosed. Fee
shifting based on frivolous and groundless litigation was devel-
oped and expanded. Many jurisdictions also expanded the
judge’s power to impose sanctions in discovery disputes on a
largely discretionary basis. Some courts developed “fill in the
box” forms for summary-judgment motions that narrowly
restricted presentation of such motions. More recently, discov-
ery has continued to be trimmed back, and a focus is develop-
ing on restricting or eliminating expert witnesses as a cost-sav-
ing measure. 
Each of these trends has followed the theme set by the Con-
ference in 1986. They each focus on reducing participant con-
trol, reducing flexibility, and reducing direct involvement
between the judge and the participants to yield a more auto-
mated management system. In the terminology of Pink and
Tyler, they primarily seek to reduce participant autonomy and
voice.
As explained by Tyler and Pink, the management model the
courts have been using is the same management model that
has dominated American governance and business manage-
ment for a century: the extrinsic model. The dominant
approach to civil litigation management has relied on what is
essentially a set of boilerplate timelines and limitations backed
up by extrinsic sanctions for violation and, to a lesser extent, a
degree of incentives for compliance. Our approach has been
very much like Henry Ford’s factory floor. The approach casts
the judge in the role of drover herding the case and partici-
pants down a generically defined path of gates and chutes from
as remote a position as possible. 
Tyler and Pink’s research would predict that the dominant
model applied to civil case management would result in poor
self-regulation by participants, extensive time spent on sanc-
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41. In fact, there have been a number of surveys that confirm the
widespread dissatisfaction among members of the bar as well as
their clients. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND
THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYS-
TEM 2 (2009):
In short, the survey revealed widely-held opinions that
there are serious problems in the civil justice system generally
and that the discovery system, though not broken, is badly in
need of attention. Judges increasingly must serve as referees in
acrimonious discovery disputes, rather than deciding cases on
their merits. From the outside, the system is often perceived
as cumbersome and inefficient. The emergence of various
forms of alternate dispute resolution emphasizes this point. 
tioning non-compliance, exten-
sive resources devoted to some
form of surveillance system, and
widespread dissatisfaction with
the system of management as
well as the results. More point-
edly, they predict that our stan-
dard civil-case-management
model would encourage unethi-
cal behavior. The reader can
evaluate the validity of these predictions.
The reader’s own experience should be sufficient to detail
the shortcomings in the extrinsic model for civil case man-
agement. Any time judges assemble to discuss civil case man-
agement, someone will inevitably observe that “there is noth-
ing civil about civil litigation.” This observation will be fol-
lowed by a period of telling horror stories about egregious
behavior by lawyers in civil cases. A similar assembly of civil
litigators will yield similar tales of obstreperous behavior by
opposing counsel. The litigators will add to these stories dis-
turbing tales of arbitrary restrictions and timelines imposed
on them by autocratic judges or court systems that all but
barred them from any reasonable opportunity to present the
merits of their case. An assembly of sophisticated civil-litiga-
tion clients will yield these categories of stories as well as con-
siderable discussion about the staggering costs of these frus-
tratingly ineffective experiences.41
The original cliché was that the proof of the pudding is in
the eating. The steady trend for several decades now has been
civil disputants increasingly turning to “alternate dispute reso-
lution.” That trend has many positives, but the judiciary must
be mindful that in turning to other fora, the disputants are
turning away from the courts. They do not reject our civil
courts in favor of other fora because of their overriding satis-
faction with our quality and credibility. Too frequently, the
community has tasted the civil court’s pudding and rejected it. 
The body of work on human behavior exemplified by Tyler
and Pink also explains some of the reasons for the dissatisfac-
tion with the existing system. The participants are given no
voice and no autonomy. Participants are given no role in defin-
ing the purpose of the proceedings. Paths, deadlines, limits are
generically set with no accommodation (or, rarely, very little)
for the unique needs of the participants.
Tyler notes that such an extrinsic-compliance model
requires that the participants be certain they will be sanctioned
for violating the rules and rewarded for compliance. This, in
turn, requires an extensive and heavily resourced system of
surveillance. Civil litigation management systems at the court-
house, however, have limited mechanisms for direct surveil-
lance and ever-dwindling resources. The “surveillance” in civil
litigation is usually the report of the opposing lawyer (“Mov-
ing counsel failed to comply with the duty to confer before fil-
ing the current motion, and it should be stricken for that rea-
son alone”)—and compliance or violation can be highly sub-
jective at times (“I attempted to confer with opposing counsel
but could not obtain a response; opposing counsel is the one
in violation of the duty to confer”). Consequently, our civil
management systems devote substantial time to exchanging
adversarial and counterproductive letters that are meant pri-
marily to shape the “record” that may be presented to a judge
someday. Moreover, in practice, our sanction system is rela-
tively toothless and the reward system relatively illusory. Con-
sequently, even accepting the limits that can be achieved by an
extrinsic system, widespread criticism and dissatisfaction
exists with what is, in reality, a poorly executed and poorly
resourced extrinsic system.
2. Intrinsic-Model Civil Case Management
This article proposes pursuit of the intrinsic model, a model
based on active engagement with the participants, using the
principles of procedural justice. The cornerstone of modern
developments in behavioral and management research, exem-
plified in this article by Tyler and Pink, is that a leader will
achieve substantially more by engaging on an individualized
basis with those to be led and giving the participants as much
input as reasonably possible. The research predicts that an
engagement-based model of case management will require
fewer resources than the existing model and will result in the
participants having greater satisfaction with and trust in our
court system.  
One does not need the research to predict this result, how-
ever. Common sense and life experience make the same pre-
diction. Anyone reading this article has likely already reached
the conclusion that the dominant model for civil case manage-
ment of the last few decades is unsatisfactory. Life experience
demonstrates that being treated like a number and being
herded through the line at the archetypal Department of Motor
Vehicles makes people less cooperative, less compliant, and
less satisfied with the results they receive. 
Applying this research to court systems is not new. Intrin-
sic-management models, specifically in the form of procedural
justice, have now been used for a considerable time in the
drug-court model (including problem-solving courts, treat-
ment courts, and collaborative courts). Because of their usual
model of grant funding, drug courts have been particularly
well vetted by empirical research. That testing research con-
firms the predictions of greater cooperation and compliance
with court direction when case management is based on an
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intrinsic model.42 The intrinsic model is also gaining adherents
in the realm of domestic-relations cases.43
Our pilot program provided a real-world laboratory to iden-
tify mechanisms for implementing this engagement model to
civil litigation. While a controlled experiment and further study
is required, our observations of those mechanisms in action
suggest the promised rewards are real. More importantly, tam-
ing the process allows the participants and the judge to stop lit-
igating the litigation. In turn, this allows participants to focus
on resolving the core disputes and allows the judge to spend her
or his time on improving the court’s delivery of distributive jus-
tice—that fair and just result the community needs. The
remainder of this article shares the practical lessons our pilot
taught us in trying to implement an engagement model.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
For those readers that skipped the section giving the high-
altitude view of developments in behavior research, the ulti-
mate lesson is easily summarized and is supported by common
sense as well as the research. Your child needs an important
medical procedure, but it is unusual and you are not sure of
your family’s health-insurance coverage or if any prerequisites
to coverage must be addressed. Do you want to call the insur-
ance company and get (a) a prerecorded voice telling you to
push 1 or 2 to select among options that seem to have no appli-
cation to your problem, (b) have a live person answer the
phone in a hurried voice only to say “please hold,” return after
several minutes, distractedly ask, “what department?” with the
sound of a clicking keyboard and multiple other voices in the
background, and then transfer you without explanation before
you even complete a sentence only to find you have been
transferred to voicemail for watercraft claims, or (c) have a live
person answer the telephone in a pleasant and professional
voice, ask you how they can be of help, demonstrate that they
are listening to you and understanding what you are seeking,
explain to you who they think can help and why, give you that
person’s name, title, and direct-dial number, and then offer to
transfer you to the person? If you answered (c) and you can
follow the “golden rule” of applying that answer when others
come to you with their cases, you can save reading all those
research studies. The philosophical foundations of an engage-
ment-based model of civil case management are described in
this section.
A. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
MATTERS—HOW ONE
CHARTS THE COURSE
IS AS IMPORTANT AS
THE COURSE
Tyler is the founder and
leading exponent of a move-
ment known as procedural jus-
tice. For our purposes, the pro-
cedural-justice movement can
be summarized as teaching the
lesson that litigants care as
much (and, proponents would
argue, more) about whether
they were treated fairly as
whether they win.44 This research also tells us that the single
most important factor in increasing compliance, cooperation,
and satisfaction with court rulings is the quality of the judge’s
interaction with the participants.45 A successful civil-case-
management model must address the need for a quality inter-
action between the participants and the judge.
Tyler and Pink identify the elements needed to ensure a
model that will promote quality interaction between leader
and team. Tyler defines them as voice, neutrality, respect, and
trust. Pink defines them as autonomy, mastery, and purpose.
In the context of a civil-case-management model, we can
focus on Tyler’s elements of voice and trust as well as Pink’s ele-
ments of autonomy and purpose. For this discussion, these are
all ultimately different aspects of the same idea. Every person
(read lawyer or client, depending on the stage of the proceed-
ing) has an ingrained need to feel heard and addressed as an
individual. Voice acknowledges that the individual wishes to
have a chance to speak and be heard.46 Trust acknowledges that
each individual has unique needs, one of which is to feel those
needs are being addressed.47 Pink adds that people need to feel
that they have some input on what is being done and that there
is a purpose to what they are being asked to do. The less these
aspects of an individual’s need to be acknowledged are
addressed, the more dissatisfied, uncooperative, and non-com-
pliant the person will be. 
Tyler states that his research specific to court systems
demonstrates that the converse is also true. The more the indi-
vidual participant’s need to be acknowledged is served, the
more the person is satisfied.48 This increased satisfaction
remains robust even when the person does not get the outcome
wanted.49 The result is that the single most effective tool in get-
Court Review - Volume 50 181
In the context of 
a civil-case-
management
model, we can
focus on Tyler’s 
elements of voice
and trust as well 
as Pink’s elements
of autonomy 
and purpose.
50. See generally id. at 12-13 (noting that higher satisfaction leads to
higher compliance).
51. For simplicity, the term “purpose” is used in this article to refer-
ence both the desires and the needs of the participant. The two are
often different. Depending on the circumstances and the relative
practicality of the participant’s desires and needs, either may be
the dominant factor driving the judge’s actions.
52. See Burke & Leben, supra note 20, at 6 (discussing the “trustwor-
thy authorities” dimension).
ting compliance with court
requirements is for the par-
ticipant to be heard as an
individual. The perceived
fairness of the procedure
used to reach the decision is
seven times as important as
the perceived fairness of the
decision (the outcome) to
predicting participant accep-
tance. 50
This behavioral science
research confirms that high
touch works better than high tech for some issues. Realizing
that procedural justice matters leads inevitably to the second
philosophical pillar for our model: To serve participant needs,
one must understand the participants’ purpose.
Think of the civil-litigation judge as an itinerant small-
cargo-ship captain where the ship’s crew is supplied by the
owner. During the litigation, the judge has the ultimate author-
ity and control over the ship. However, the owner is the one
that decides whether a cruise will take place and determines
the destination. The owner hires and fires the crew. The owner
is also paying the expenses of the ship, and the crew’s ultimate
loyalty follows their paychecks. The wise captain consults the
owner and crew about the timetable, destinations, and course.
He also consults the crew about any specific needs they may
have. That owner and crew will be much more cooperative and
satisfied with the captain if they have been consulted and their
needs addressed. 
B. IN LITIGATION, THE VERDICT IS NOT THE 
“PURPOSE”—ONE MUST DETERMINE THE 
DESTINATION TO CHART THE COURSE51
With this philosophical pillar, Pink’s research and model
more directly address the point. One of Pink’s elements for an
intrinsic model of management is “purpose.” The person or
persons being managed must feel that the work they are doing
has a purpose and that it is a purpose they accept as theirs. A
person that sees no purpose in his or her actions or has a dif-
ferent purpose than the manager will lead to difficulties. An
effective civil case manager will take into account the need to
provide purpose.
Ask the low-level lawyer why she is litigating a case, and she
will say, “That’s my job.” Ask the middling lawyer why he is lit-
igating a case, and he will exclaim, “I’m in it to win it.” Ask the
wise lawyer why she is litigating, and she will say she is serv-
ing her client’s goal; she will then explain what that goal is and
how the litigation serves that purpose, as well as how she and
her client plan to achieve the goal in the end. A friend of mine
used to put it another way: “a lot of lawyers chasing judgments
are like dogs chasing a car—they don’t know what to do with
one if they catch it or why they chased it in the first place.”
Surprisingly few lawyers seem to understand that winning a
verdict is almost never the party’s purpose in pursuing civil lit-
igation. The party’s purpose, the client’s purpose, is to solve a
problem—to achieve a specific goal. The purpose of the litiga-
tion needs to be to help solve that problem—to serve the
client’s ultimate goal.
The goal of the business client may take many forms, but it
usually boils down to profitability. The goal in the neighbor-
hood dispute is usually each party’s version of quiet enjoyment
of the party’s property. The goal of the real-estate litigant is a
title that is clear and usually marketable, which is most likely
serving, in turn, another concrete goal such as sale or financ-
ing. The goal of the personal-injury plaintiff is to address his
or her perceived needs resulting from the accident. In some
cases, the client’s goal is purely a matter of vanity. Getting a
judgment is only one step, and far too often a pyrrhic step,
toward the client’s actual goal. The party’s actual goal is what
drives litigation, not winning a verdict. Understanding this
basic truth is the ultimate keystone to achieving efficient and
effective civil litigation management. For if the litigation is dri-
ven by the clients’ goals, civil case management should also be
given the purpose of serving the collective legitimate goal of
the parties.
This basic concept is also expressed in the procedural-jus-
tice movement. As noted above, one dimension of procedural
justice is called “trust” (and can be described as “helpfulness”
for our purposes). This term refers to the need of the partici-
pant to believe that the court has an interest in serving the par-
ticipant’s needs.52 To achieve “trust,” the court must seek to
address actual, individualized purposes rather than assume a
ubiquitous purpose of a favorable verdict.
To return to our mythical question of why litigation partic-
ipants do what they do, ask the judge for the purpose of civil
case management and most will say “to reach the end.” Con-
sequently, civil case management under the traditional model
is too frequently designed like the automated telephone sys-
tem—designed to get people to the end of the telephone call
with as little effort from the entity receiving the call as possi-
ble. Like that caller, far too many people get nothing out of the
litigation experience so managed—at least, nothing beyond
termination of the call after a great deal of frustration and a
very large telephone bill.
However, under an intrinsic model, the purpose of the liti-
gation drives its management. Civil case management should
be crafted to give the parties an effective resolution (distribu-
tive justice) as efficiently as possible. If the goal is to provide
parties with the most effective resolution available, the judge
must attempt to determine the goals of the parties—the pur-
pose of the litigation. Identifying the goals of the participants
to the litigation—even if only the goals that participants are
willing to reveal—can allow the judge to identify an effective
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resolution that is within the court’s ability to provide. That, in
turn, allows the judge to define the purpose of the litigation.
When necessary, the judge can also re-set participants’ unrea-
sonable expectations to the kinds of resolutions the court can
actually provide. Moreover, identifying an effective and avail-
able resolution can allow the judge to identify the most effi-
cient path to that resolution—if you don’t know the destina-
tion, you cannot chart the course. 
Civil case management can learn valuable lessons from its
colleagues in criminal and domestic case management. As ref-
erenced earlier, these fields are seeing rapid growth in what
they call “problem-solving” courts or “collaborative” courts.
While one can debate at length the specifics of these courts,
their foundational insight is irrefutable. The problem-solving-
court movement is based on the realization that a person’s par-
ticipation in a court case is usually a symptom that is driven by
an underlying problem. If that problem can be addressed effec-
tively, everyone is better served. Additionally, as long as that
problem is not addressed, the person will continue to consume
court and community resources.53 The same general concepts
apply to civil litigation, though hopefully with considerably
fewer substance-abuse and mental-health issues. 
A critical first step in a problem-solving-court case is for the
participants to articulate collectively the goal. Having recog-
nized a goal, the participants then identify (as best they can)
the issues that prevent the client from achieving that goal.54
Problem-solving courts follow this method on the macro and
the micro levels. Again, the same conceptual approach is
highly effective in civil case management. Whether focused on
the litigation as a whole or an individual issue that has arisen,
the civil judge that takes a few minutes to have a “live” dis-
cussion with the participants to identify the current goal and
the impediments will find his or her cases running substan-
tially smoother and requiring remarkably few court resources.
In summary, civil litigation is driven by trying to achieve a
client’s goal. Effective and efficient civil case management is dri-
ven by recognition of those goals and identifying the impedi-
ments to achieving them. While the parties’ goals will be highly
varied, the goal is rarely as simple as paying the full “sticker
price” for litigation and winning a verdict after trial. Conse-
quently, a justice-delivery system should strive to provide its
customers with effective and efficient resolutions addressing
their goals or, at the least, their needs. Systems that ignore their
customers’ goals will continue to generate more dissatisfaction
and wasted resources than justice. They will also continue to
undermine public confidence in the judiciary as a credible
method of resolving disputes. A civil court should be seen as a
problem-solving court rather than a verdict assembly line.
To revisit the analogy of the itinerant cargo captain, the cap-
tain cannot assume delivery by the fastest course is always the
goal. The owner may need a particular sequence or market
timing to serve other obligations.
If the captain does not learn of
the owner’s goals, the captain
will not likely be successful in
delivering the most efficient and
effective service to those goals.
C. THE LAWYER IS THE
JUDGE’S ALLY—WORK
WITH THE CREW, NOT
AGAINST THEM
Pink notes that at the heart of the traditional model of busi-
ness management is a view that the worker is the enemy and,
if not closely supervised, will accomplish nothing. A similar
premise about lawyers underlies the dominant model of civil
case management. The Conference observed in 1986 that
lawyer control of case management was the problem. The Con-
ference’s goal was to take control away from the lawyer—the
apparent enemy. Also as noted, a common complaint today is
that “there is nothing civil about civil litigation.” At the heart
of the traditional models of civil case management is a view
that the lawyer is the root of the problem. 
However, in an intrinsic-motivation-and-engagement
model, the lawyer is a key participant in effective and efficient
case management. This can be one of the greatest leaps of faith
a judge interested in an engagement model must take. How-
ever, years of experimenting with this model in our pilot court-
rooms suggest it works. Tyler and Pink’s research not only pre-
dicts that it will work, it also explains why it works.
The effectiveness of this strategy is again rooted in the prin-
ciples of procedural justice and serving participant needs and
goals. The secret for the judge seeking efficient and effective
case management is to realize that the individual lawyer is as
much a participant in the process as the party. In fact, for many
of the most distraction-prone issues in the litigation, the
lawyer is the primary participant. Thus, procedural-justice
research is as applicable to the lawyer as to the client. The
judge can achieve considerable results by recognizing the value
of serving the lawyer’s needs for voice and trust. Despite the
stereotype that popular media and much of the legal profession
have built, even civil litigators are human beings that respond
positively to being treated respectfully and individually. And,
like other human beings, they respond poorly to being smoth-
ered with boilerplate and ignored.
This is a philosophy that is easy to test and implement. In
the modern era of civil litigation, face time with the judge is
extraordinarily rare. The growth of the bar and technology
make face time between lawyers relatively uncommon as well.
This isolation and modern digital communication leads to a
degree of false courage and hyper-partisanship. These factors
give the judge considerable power to leverage his or her time
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to resolve issues dividing the
lawyers. The simple expedient
of the judge meeting in person
with the lawyers and demon-
strating that the lawyers have
the judge’s full attention is a
remarkable elixir.55 Disputes
that can consume dozens of
hours of expensive attorney time
as well as dozens of pages of
dense legal briefs begin to melt
away. 
In a very different context, Father Mike Surufka discussed
the challenges of addressing difficult and debilitating problems
with his parishioners. He described the “transformative
power” of simply listening as follows:
[T]he first step is always to listen, to see what is actually
happening in the life of this person. That has more trans-
formative power than just about anything. For some-
body really to know that they were heard at a very deep
level.56
The truth is that in the modern world (in and out of court),
the most precious and persuasive gift one can bestow upon
another person is one’s genuine and undivided attention.
One cannot be too Pollyannaish. We must recognize that,
whether consciously or unconsciously, the lawyer’s goals are
not always the same as the client’s. The judge must be mindful
of this distinction in working with the lawyers. A useful tactic
is to require the lawyer to articulate the client’s goal at every
interaction. This exercise helps keep the client’s goals foremost
in the minds of all and helps the individual lawyer as well as
the judge prioritize those client goals.
Returning to our ship captain, the captain may be in charge
of the ship, but the crew does the bulk of the actual labor. In
our example, the captain gets a new crew with each ship, and
the crew members are more loyal to the owner that pays them
than a single-voyage captain. Working with that crew and
communicating with them to earn their trust may not always
be the key to surviving the trip, but it will always be the key to
an efficient voyage with a cohesive crew.
THE STRATEGIES
These philosophical foundations point to a better model of
case management, a model with an engaged judge pursuing
effective and efficient individualized case management. This
case-management philosophy can be implemented by follow-
ing four simple strategies.
A. BRING ’EM IN AND ENGAGE, ENGAGE, ENGAGE
As noted earlier, face time with the judge is exceedingly rare
today and, as a result, is one of the most powerful tools avail-
able to the judge. The whole idea of the engagement model and
the core lessons from Tyler and Pink require direct engagement
with the participants to provide voice and define purpose. This
need not be a lengthy and involved exercise, either. The
research from drug courts tells us that a judge need spend only
three minutes with a defendant to satisfy the desire for voice.
In civil litigation, the time requirement will vary significantly
by the issue being addressed, but the judge should not assume
he does not have time to engage. Based on the experience in
the pilot, the judge will gain time. Bring the participants into
the courtroom for a live discussion as early in the case as pos-
sible, and then bring them in when any issue seems to be
developing. Engagement simply cannot be achieved through
documents—and a few minutes of face time can avoid hours of
reading unnecessary briefs and seeking clarification.
The judge should use every interaction with the partici-
pants to demonstrate that she is engaged with their case. The
judge should use each interaction to foster a culture among the
team of collaborative problem solving. Through the judge’s
interactions, she will set the expectations of the participants as
well as demonstrate the elements of procedural fairness. She
will, thereby, gain the participants’ cooperation, compliance,
and ultimate satisfaction with the result.
A “bring ’em in” strategy requires the judge (in person or
through trained staff) to maintain engagement by monitoring
the developments in the case shown by the pleadings. If brief-
ing on a legitimate substantive issue is unclear, avoid the dis-
traction of a misunderstanding in a ruling or unclear further
briefing by spending five minutes in person or by telephone
with the lawyers to get clarification. Making time to squeeze in
a live interaction with the relevant participants on an expe-
dited basis before the judge drives home or during lunch will
pay substantial benefits to his schedule in the long run.
A few years ago, I had a civil case filed by a prisoner chal-
lenging an administrative decision by the prison officials.
Having a status conference that involves a pro se prisoner can
be a logistical challenge and unpleasant. So, I disregarded our
engagement philosophy and followed a more mainstream
approach. The case raised some complex issues, and the briefs
were like ships passing in the night on some issues. I thought
I could decipher the issues, and I ruled on the briefs without
ever having direct contact with the participants. The plaintiff
prisoner appealed my ruling. The appellate court followed the
same philosophy I had, ruling on ambiguous briefs without
ever having direct contact with the participants to resolve
those ambiguities. The appellate court deciphered the briefs
dramatically differently than I had. The appellate court
remanded the case to my court with instructions that were
indecipherable to me based on my understanding of the case.
At this point, I realized I was caught in the fallacy of trying to
[T]he most 
precious . . . gift
one can bestow
upon another
person is one’s
. . . undivided
attention.
55. See NAT’L DRUG COURT INST., THE DRUG COURT JUDICIAL BENCHBOOK
51-52 (Douglas B. Marlowe & William G. Meyer eds., 2011) (dis-
cussing the importance of the court’s interaction with participants
to reinforce perceptions of equitable treatment); Douglas B. Mar-
lowe et al., The Judge Is a Key Component of Drug Court, 6 DRUG
CT. REV. 1, 1-34 (2004) (discussing the value, if any, of frequent
status hearings and judicial intervention).
56. See id.; see generally Heidi Glenn, As Social Issues Drive Young from
Church, Leaders Try to Keep Them, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 18,
2013), http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?
storyId=169646736.
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achieve efficiency by avoiding engagement. Before either side
could file a motion or a brief, I issued an order to set a status
conference and identified the issue to be addressed as clarify-
ing the parties’ understanding of the issues on remand.
Despite my experience, I was a bit worried about the proce-
dural havoc a sophisticated pro se prisoner plaintiff could
cause if given the opportunity. As I took appearances for the
telephone status conference, I could hear similar concerns in
the form of aggressiveness from the prison’s attorney. As the
pro se party was the plaintiff, I took a deep breath and gave
the prisoner the first chance to give his view of the issues. He
spoke for less than three minutes. At the conclusion of the
three minutes, we were all on the same page and could see
clearly the path forward. 
At this point, the case was about one and a half years old.
The case had occupied time and resources in my court as well
as the appellate court. The case had occupied prison and attor-
ney-general resources. The case had also occupied the prisoner
during that time. Much of that one and a half years of litigation
was wasted and could have been avoided by me investing those
few minutes for the status conference at the beginning. We
quickly packaged more clearly the key legal issue for appellate
review (which was what would be necessary for the needs of
both sides in the case). We later received a well reasoned and
helpful appellate opinion resolving the novel legal issue. Given
the unique history and issue in the case, I held a further status
conference. I was rewarded with strong expressions of satisfac-
tion with our legal system from both the prison lawyer and the
pro se prisoner—as well as a stipulated concrete end to a case
that could have spanned several more years.
B. ALWAYS ASK WHY, OR, KNOW THE GOAL TO SET
THE PURPOSE
As noted, the purpose of the civil litigant in pursuing litiga-
tion is not the goal of obtaining a verdict. Instead, civil litiga-
tion is driven by the goals of the parties to the litigation. The
closer the judge57 can get to understanding the civil-litigation
participants’ separate goals (their reasons for pursuing the liti-
gation), the more efficiently the judge can guide the litigation
to an effective resolution. Do not misunderstand this as con-
verting the judge into a counselor of some kind. The judge’s
job is not to be a therapist, business consultant, or mediator.
Neither should one confuse the judge understanding the par-
ticipants’ stated goals with adopting those goals as the purpose
of the litigation. To serve procedural justice and intrinsic moti-
vation, the judge need only demonstrate appreciation and rea-
sonable accommodation of the parties’ separate goals in setting
the judge’s purpose for the case. The judge’s job is to identify
the most effective resolution that is proper for a court to pro-
vide and then reach that resolution as efficiently and produc-
tively as possible. Identifying the participants’ stated goals
serves only to inform the judge
in accomplishing this task.
Resolving the lawsuit often will
not resolve the parties’ compet-
ing goals. The litigation is only
one aspect of that contest, and
the judge is only responsible for
resolving the litigation dimen-
sion of the problem. However,
the more the judge understands
the participants’ underlying
goals, the more the judge can
identify what the courthouse
can legitimately provide to the participants that will be pro-
ductive. Once the judge identifies what the courthouse can
provide, the judge can get the case focused on an efficient and
effective path to that resolution.
Put another way, Pink refers to the word “why” as the most
underutilized word in business.58 It is also the most underuti-
lized word in civil litigation. A judge should frequently ask the
participants “why.” Why is your client pursuing this litigation?
Why are you filing that motion? Why does your client want to
oppose that motion? Why do you want additional time? Why
do you oppose granting additional time? Why does your client
want that discovery? Why does your client want to resist that
discovery? Why will trial take that many days? 
By way of example, if the parties truly need a trial, they usu-
ally only need the trial on a small number of central disputes.
The judge can streamline the discovery and the pretrial pro-
ceedings to focus the proceedings on those genuine issues and
get the trial done as quickly as possible. If the parties need an
appellate ruling on a narrow question of unsettled law for the
benefit of their industry, the case can be structured to get to the
ruling without wasting resources on any more ancillary issues
or discovery than absolutely necessary. If the real goal of the
side that will pay is to put off the payment until the next quar-
ter, and this is practical for the receiving side, the case can be
managed to do as little as possible until the next quarter and
then ramp it up rapidly if needed. If the goal of one party is to
delay the inevitable inappropriately, the case can be put on a
rocket docket and aggressively policed for delaying tactics. In
the same vein, if the party’s goal is not legitimate or not avail-
able through the courthouse, the judge can disabuse that party
of that illegitimate goal or, if unsuccessful, manage the case to
a quick resolution.59
The judge should also keep in mind that the first answer to
the question is often not truly the answer to the question. A
rule of thumb popular among business-management consul-
tants is that a leader must ask herself why she wants to pursue
a policy five successive times to get down to the real purpose.
Only then, when she has peeled back the layers to the core rea-
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son, can she effectively commu-
nicate to her organization a pur-
pose that can become a shared
goal. A judge need not necessar-
ily put the question to the partic-
ipant five times, but she should
be willing to ask a follow-up
“why” one or more times to get
to the core purpose.
The strategy of asking why works on the micro level of each
individual procedural or discovery issue as well as, if not better
than, it works at the macro level of the overall path to resolving
the litigation, and it is considerably easier to implement. This is
particularly true for the judge with limited experience with civil
clients and the nature of their true goals. The good news for the
judge with limited civil experience is that substantial gains in
docket efficiency can be achieved by focusing primarily on the
micro level, the level at which every judge has sufficient expe-
rience and knowledge to apply these principles. 
This strategy is also well suited for simple and low-risk
tests of the overall civil-case-management approach proposed
in this article. Pick an isolated issue or case and give this
approach a trial run. The test need be no more sophisticated
than asking each side to identify its goals and its concerns in
a real-time discussion—ask each “why,” and then ask again.
With surprising frequency, a path to resolution will reveal
itself almost immediately without any further action by the
judge. The speed with which that path to resolution can be
accomplished will also be surprising when compared to the
time needed for the judge to digest all those briefs and attach-
ments filed under an extrinsic-model, management-by-boiler-
plate system.
C. STREAMLINE AND CUSTOMIZE, PURSUE “LAGOM”
For courts, we now exist in a world of continuing resource
scarcity and rising productivity demands. Courts must work
smarter in case management. Unfortunately, most current
trends among judges in civil case management assume that
generic and remote case management (management by boiler-
plate) promises reduced courthouse workloads. This promise
is illusory and, in practice, usually counterproductive. This
philosophy equates more prepackaged case management with
less work for the judge. This philosophy emphasizes the “fire-
and-forget” rules that are billed as self-executing and are said
to require no involvement from the court. The approach cre-
ates a rigid path (or, in differential case management, a small
selection of paths) leading to trial and is said to free the judge
of any involvement other than conducting the trial. The
promises made by this self-executing approach to heavily pre-
packaged case management are an alluring temptation to over-
worked judges. The extensive body of research supporting the
procedural-justice movement and intrinsic-motivation model
directly refutes this premise, demonstrating that boilerplate
justice reduces compliance rather than raising it.60
If one talks to the lawyers doing the actual litigation, they
report that an inordinate amount of their expensive time and
their clients’ resources is spent on navigating (both through
and around) those “self-executing” rules. Those lawyers also
reveal that they frequently ignore those complex layers of
rules and simply resort to self-help. If one talks to the judge
in a candid mood, the judge will quickly reveal that he or she
spends a great deal of time administering those “self-execut-
ing” rules, much like the parent negotiating with the three-
year-old about how many peas satisfy the requirement that the
child take one bite.  
If one spends a few minutes reviewing the discovery
motions filed in a court that embraces the self-executing-rule
philosophy, the misnomer will become readily apparent.
Inevitably, pages and pages of briefing are devoted to disputing
the meaning, application, and exceptions to those extensive
rules that were supposed to be self-executing. One is inevitably
put in mind of the old speaker’s cliché that the rules of golf are
but a few pages while the decisions interpreting those rules
occupy volumes.
The judges do not like these process disputes, the lawyers
do not like these process disputes but feel forced into them,
and the clients always know that process disputes are a waste
of their money and resources. The model of ever-deeper layers
of boilerplate and ever-less individual engagement of the judge
with the participants is counterproductive. The model simply
promotes litigating the litigation instead of pursuing a produc-
tive path to a credible resolution.
Moreover, experience teaches that these elaborate proce-
dures frequently prove unnecessary. Returning to discovery
disputes (the bane of the civil judge’s docket), many judges
have experimented with elaborate requirements and limita-
tions. Compliance requires at least an hour of attorney time on
one side for the narrowest and simplest of disputes. However,
in most instances, a five-minute telephone call between coun-
sel and the judge could resolve the issue. Ultimately, efficiency
is achieved by eliminating, not multiplying, the unnecessary.
The research behind the procedural-justice movement
should teach us that serving the participant’s need for individ-
ualized treatment increases court productivity while ignoring
that need increases court workload. Civil litigation is driven by
the goals of the participants; civil case management should be
as well. 
The Swedes have a concept called “lagom.” 61 The term
means neither too little nor too much. Lagom is a standard that
is reminiscent of Goldilocks evaluating porridge, chairs, or
beds. The judge interested in efficient and effective case man-
agement should strive to achieve lagom in the time and
resources he or she devotes to each case. The judge should also
seek lagom in the time and resources of the parties that are
consumed. Also, the judge should seek lagom in the degree of
disruption to the wider community resulting from the pen-
dency of the litigation. The question is not how many trials
have been held, how many cases have been resolved, or how
many experts retained; the right questions are whether the
court has given the parties resolutions needed, whether the
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parties have accepted and used those resolutions, and how effi-
ciently those resolutions were provided. 
D. ENGAGE THE SMALL DISPUTE TO ELIMINATE THE
DISTRACTION
This strategy shares a common root with streamlining but
addresses more directly the judge’s attitude toward dispute res-
olution. Many court systems faced with rising caseloads and
fed up with seemingly endless and picayune squabbles over
discovery and other pretrial motions erect substantial barriers
between the lawyers and the judge—the court’s version of that
automated telephone-answering system. Effectively, this type
of system is designed to suppress disputes rather than resolve
the issues. Rather than dispute suppression, the judge should
pursue a policy of engagement.
Dispute suppression is neither efficient nor effective case
management. These efforts often backfire on the judge by
intensifying and multiplying the disputes when they finally
reach the boiling point. Also, dispute suppression is funda-
mentally unfair to the parties. In most disputes, one side will
be working from a position of relative weakness. If the court’s
goal is simply to suppress disputes so that issues will not be
brought to the courthouse, one side is likely to have a sub-
stantial advantage in the court’s absence. 
Instead, the judge should affirmatively engage the discovery
and procedural disputes. Doing so quickly and efficiently elim-
inates them as distractions and focuses the resources of the
parties and the court on the core issues in the case. Eliminat-
ing these distracting side trips quickly and efficiently keeps
everyone on the central path to resolution.
Consider the example of a typical discovery dispute. The
lawyers exchange a request and an objection about a discreet
set of records. The lawyers then craft letters under a local rule
requiring them to confer, letters that primarily serve a postur-
ing role. Due to that false courage that results from the lawyers
interacting digitally, the letters drive them to harden their posi-
tions. The lawyers are moving quickly by litigation standards,
and these opening exchanges consume only a few weeks. One
side then files a motion, pouring pent-up agitation and frus-
tration onto the pages and consuming hours of research and
crafting time. The opposing lawyer receives the opening
motions and stews on it. The discovery dispute is sufficiently
central to the overall discovery effort, and the rhetoric is
heated enough that all other discovery halts as a result of the
dispute. The opposing lawyer submits a response brief at the
deadline, typically about three weeks after the motion was
filed. The lawyers confer with their clients. Each has a con-
scious or unconscious eye toward justifying to their clients the
bill for the time spent on the discovery dispute and explains
how obstructionist the other party/lawyer has become in the
case. The moving lawyer then prepares and files a reply brief,
raising the level of animosity yet again and adding other com-
plaints about the opponent’s behavior to strengthen the
motion. This, in turn, leads to a side trip from the discovery
distraction to a dispute over whether a sur-reply brief will be
permitted.
These various motions drone on for weeks, sometimes
months, consuming substantial party resources. The judge
notices the rising tide of discovery and procedural pleadings.
But, overwhelmed by a daunting
caseload and schooled in the
idea that such disputes are little
more than ego-driven jousting
between civil lawyers, keeps
shuffling them to the bottom of
the priority list. As the lawyers
receive silence from the court-
house, they fill the void with more pleadings and an ever-spi-
raling level of animosity. When the judge finally decides to
tackle the pile of pleadings, she must devote hours to review-
ing and re-reviewing the dense briefing. The briefing is so dis-
tracted by battles between the lawyers, her primary chore is
separating the wheat from the chaff. The question inevitably
on her lips throughout hours of reviewing these briefs is “what
is the issue they actually want me to decide?” The judge’s frus-
tration grows as her scarce time ticks away, and she ends up
issuing a relatively rushed ruling. While legally correct and
adequate, the ruling gives little explanation and demonstrates
little analysis of the individual case. Given the length of brief-
ing, the abrupt and minimalist ruling leaves both lawyers dis-
satisfied with the result and complaining loudly to their clients
about the broken civil litigation system.
Consider how this all-too-typical discovery issue is handled
under an engagement strategy instead of a suppression strat-
egy. The court has a rule prohibiting the counsel from filing a
discovery motion until first getting the court’s permission at a
live status conference. A corollary of this rule is that the judge
makes herself available to the parties within two business days
of being requested. The lawyers exchange a discovery request
and objection. The lawyers then connect by telephone. As they
cannot resolve their dispute, they jointly call the judge’s clerk.
The judge’s clerk works them in during the lunch break in the
ongoing jury trial the same day. The two lawyers appear as
scheduled. The judge asks each lawyer what the lawyer is try-
ing to accomplish and to identify the lawyer’s concerns. The
lawyers nearly always reach a resolution at that stage. If they
do not, the judge may have to ask more pointed questions. If
no agreement is then reached, the judge nearly always has
enough information to issue a ruling immediately. The dispute
has interrupted the litigation path to resolution for a matter of
days once the objection was issued. The dispute has occupied
less than 10 minutes of the judge’s time. The dispute has con-
sumed minimal party resources. The dispute has generated no
meaningful hostility or impediments to relations between the
parties or the lawyers. 
More importantly, the handling of this dispute has estab-
lished a culture of cooperative problem solving in the case.
Future distracting disputes have largely been eliminated for
that case and, to a degree, for other cases involving the same
participants. The court is also established as a credible means
of resolving disputes.
This example is not theoretical. This example unfolded
countless times during the last seven years of the engagement-
based civil-case-management project in our court.
A VIEW OF THE REALIZED MODEL
Tactics for implementing these strategies must be individu-
alized to the local legal culture and the judge’s strengths. Some-
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times, the tactics must be indi-
vidualized to the personalities
of the participants or specific
issues within a case. The more
experience the judge has in an
engagement model of civil case
management, the larger the
judge’s toolbox of tactics avail-
able. The point of this model of
case management is that each
case must be approached as an
individual set of challenges.
Thus, each case is unique and
will require its own mix of tac-
tics. 
In the most general of terms, the engaged judge should
• convene a case management conference with all partici-
pants as early as possible,
• establish a culture within the case of a team approach to
resolving problems as quickly as possible, 
• identify how (or whether) the litigation will serve the goals
of the participants,
• evaluate the management needs of the case with the partic-
ipants, and 
• streamline the discovery-and-procedural-motions process. 
What follows is a description of a sample implementation of
the model.
Phase Implementation by Case Issue Rather Than Case
Type. First and foremost, the judge must decide where to start.
One of the advantages of the management-by-engagement
approach is that implementation can be scaled to the judge’s
individual needs and resources. If the judge is nervous about a
full-scale implementation, she can define a scope of imple-
mentation to fit her comfort level. However, manufacturing
complex systems for diverting types of cases for implementa-
tion should be avoided. In other words, the judge should not
create an automated system of rules to implement his engage-
ment model. One should learn from the mistakes made in our
pilot program. We learned that, in the long run, time spent on
defining types of cases for implementation will be wasted and
often generate unnecessary opposition.
We started our civil-case-management pilot project with the
premise that a judge simply does not have time to apply an
engagement approach to all cases. This is also the most com-
mon objection raised by judges hearing about this model for
the first time—“I don’t have time for this.” Consequently, our
pilot followed the lead of many civil-case-management pro-
jects. We spent considerable time researching, negotiating,
deciding, and defining what cases would be included in the
pilot and what cases would be excluded. Our goal was simply
to divert what we thought would be a manageable number of
cases from the general pool of cases. However, defining the
scope of cases in a pilot inevitably involves one in hotly con-
tested political battles between segments of the bar. This con-
sumed considerable time and expended substantial blood-
pressure points. Anyone reading this article has likely observed
similar undertakings. This article does not describe the specific
design or operation of our pilot because, in hindsight, all that
work was unnecessary and, worse, counterproductive. To the
extent engaging in those discussions had any impact, they
made the success of the project more difficult by generating
unnecessary angst over distracting and political side disputes
between segments of the bar. 
Once I had experience with our pilot and learned the case-
management approach described in this article, I found that
our organizing principle had been wrong. Efficient and effec-
tive case management through judicial engagement means less
judge time devoted to the civil caseload rather than more. The
trick is applying the judge’s time at the right point in the case
and in the right way—a stitch in time saves nine. Conse-
quently, I expanded beyond our pilot population and applied
these philosophies to my entire civil caseload.62 The result
was a lower caseload and less time required for each case. I
saw my civil caseload drop by 58% once I started managing by
engagement. 
The easiest and most effective means of implementing man-
agement by engagement is to start by case issue. The judge
must train his staff to find discovery motions as soon as they
are filed. Upon the filing of such a motion, the judge should
have his clerk contact the lawyers and “bring ’em in” on an
expedited basis. As the judge gains comfort with an engage-
ment approach, he should start bringing cases in for early case-
management conferences. If the judge does not feel he can call
all newly filed cases in, he should choose any method conve-
nient under his administrative system for identifying cases and
bringing them in—even a random system would be fine. As the
judge gains experience, he will quickly learn that finding time
to bring in all his cases produces a net gain in time available
for civil cases.
Many judges handling civil dockets have limited experience
with civil litigation and are reluctant to pursue management at
the macro level. Experienced and inexperienced civil judges
have concerns about trying to manage the overall case to the
perceived legitimate goals of the parties. The good news is that
a judge can reap the vast majority of the benefits of civil case
management by engagement without ever expanding beyond
the micro level—applying it simply to scheduling, procedural,
motions, and discovery disputes. Management by engagement
at the macro level carries a greater risk of moving in the wrong
direction or overstepping the proper bounds of the judge’s role.
Management at that level is also rarely needed. Thus, a judge
should rarely engage in it unless the circumstances are crystal
clear, and it should be discouraged until the judge is fully com-
fortable with engaged management at the micro level.
Upon Case Filing. Once a judge has decided to apply the
model to an entire case, the model starts from the day the case
is filed. The more aggressive devotees of the extrinsic model
would trigger an exhaustive form case-management order at
the outset of the litigation to lay down the ground rules. With
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an engagement model, the judge also needs to set the tone
from the outset. As the authority figure, the judge will be
building a culture within the community of that case, whether
she realizes it or not. That culture will determine how partici-
pants approach issues in the future. At the outset of the case,
the judge should start reflecting that this case will be guided by
an actively engaged judge. Instead of responding to a filing
with silence or with an automated extrinsic-model boilerplate
case-management order, the judge should issue an order
directing the plaintiff’s counsel to set an initial case-manage-
ment conference within a relatively brief deadline. The order
should also note briefly that participants should be prepared to
address the issues in the case and set a schedule for resolving
them. I would require the conference within 45 days of the fil-
ing, knowing that I may or may not have all defendants by that
time but also knowing that if I didn’t, that would be an issue to
address rather than a reason to delay the conference. Remem-
ber, under the engagement model, the judge is taking affirma-
tive, even aggressive, control of the management of the case—
the judge is just going to use the tools of procedural justice and
intrinsic motivation to facilitate that control. 
Avoid Lengthy Boilerplate Case-Management Orders.
Remember that “perfect” boilerplate initial case-management
order? The idea is to have the participants in each case feel as
though they are being treated individually. Nothing invalidates
that effort faster than receiving an order that is reminiscent of
a cell-phone service agreement. No matter how uniform the
judge’s case-management approach, the judge should make her
written case-management orders look as short and individual-
ized as possible. 
I started civil case management with a standard order that
had checkboxes so I could quickly use one form to address
nearly any issue likely to arise in a case. I would just check the
applicable box and send out the order. It was a very efficient
system for issuing orders, but this efficient tool worked against
the efficiency of the overall system. Each party received several
pages of order even if the applicable portion was but a single
sentence. I found a low familiarity with the substance of the
orders I issued. Like that cell-phone service agreement,
nobody was bothering to read my efficient boilerplate orders. I
switched to an order that still drew from a list of standardized
phrases, but the actual order issued to the parties eliminated
everything other than the truly applicable language. Most
orders went from a few pages to a couple of sentences. As pre-
dicted by the procedural-justice research, familiarity and com-
pliance with the streamlined orders rose noticeably. 
Better yet, the judge should address case-management stan-
dards in person at the initial case-management conference.
People are inundated by documents these days, and most of
them are boilerplate with little application, so they do not get
read. A judge will be more effective if she explains in a live dis-
cussion the procedures used in her courtroom rather than to
try and issue a tome that will only be checked later to argue a
violation. Consider the irony of a common order used today
that explains at length what qualifies as a genuine, good-faith
satisfaction of the obligation of counsel to confer before bring-
ing a dispute to the court. The order usually explains that a live
conversation is required between the lawyers, rather than an
exchange of voicemails, emails, faxes, or form letters. The
irony is that this mandate of effec-
tive live communication is commu-
nicated through a boilerplate form,
the very means of communication
being banned due to its inherent
ineffectiveness. The judge should
leverage her time; she should invest
a little face time to explain the
process and reap the benefits of a
smoother case down the road.
The Initial Case-Management
Conference. The most significant
and productive 15 minutes of work
by the engagement-model judge is
the initial case-management conference. In the conference, the
judge sets the standards to which the participants will rise or
fall. The judge establishes the tone and culture of the case.
(Silence from the bench will also set a tone and culture for the
case—one that is contrary to the interests of the judge and the
community.)
The judge should start the “live” conference by taking
appearances and making sure any clients are introduced. The
judge should greet each person by name, specifically includ-
ing clients if present. The judge should briefly explain the phi-
losophy he plans to pursue in management of the case.
Assuming the judge has adopted the approaches to motions
described below, those processes and their reasons should be
explained. The judge should explain his commitments to the
case as well as what he expects of the lawyers. He should
explain that most cases, no matter how complex, usually boil
down to just a couple of key issues to be addressed. He might
also explain that these issues may or may not include an issue
for resolution by the court. The judge should state his goal for
the conference of having a candid discussion to identify the
critical path for the litigation to reach a resolution of value to
the parties. If the judge feels the need, he should also try to set
the lawyers at ease by explaining that the session is intended
for brainstorming and that statements will not be considered
admissions or binding unless a party explicitly states it is
agreeing to be bound. 
Next, the judge should turn to each side and ask them to
explain the two or three core issues they think the case boils
down to. He should ask any follow-up questions to help him
understand, and he should not hesitate to reveal any confusion
he may have. The judge should demonstrate his attention and
engagement in the discussion. As part of this discussion, the
judge will be asking the “why” questions and trying to deter-
mine the parties’ goals and reach consensus on a “purpose” for
the litigation. 
Next, the judge should build on the purpose defined for the
litigation to start charting the course. Depending on the infor-
mation revealed so far, the judge will want to ask about antic-
ipated motions, discovery needs, expert needs, any potential
obstacles to timely completion, and what is needed to make
settlement discussions productive. The flow of these discus-
sions will vary depending on the case. The judge should
always ask the participants to identify as specifically as possi-
ble the steps they plan to take, keeping in mind the value of
asking “why” when appropriate and getting consensus on the
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purpose and/or value of any
step. The judge should then
ask when the party can take
the step and when the other
side can take a responsive
step. Throughout these dis-
cussions, the judge is honor-
ing the participants’ needs for
voice, helpfulness, autonomy,
mastery, and purpose. These
discussions should then be
brought to conclusion with
specific timelines—noting
that the timeline may include
a date for deciding on a future
step if setting the date for a potential future step is premature.
In most initial status conferences, the path will be suffi-
ciently clear that the judge can go ahead and determine a clo-
sure plan for the litigation. Frequently, this will be the trial
date, discussed below.
With practice, an initial case-management conference on a
standard personal-injury case with lawyers new to the model
takes only 15 minutes. With lawyers that have been schooled
in the model on both sides, it can literally be done in as little
as 5 minutes. In the spirit of lagom, a complex case may take
an hour and may require more than one setting as parties are
joined and issues evolve.
Trial/Closure Dates. The classic wisdom of judges from
time immemorial is that nothing resolves a case like a near and
certain trial date. The problem-solving-court model disagrees,
emphasizing that the conclusion must be reached when the
defendant is ready and that times will vary significantly by per-
son. Here, our experience suggests the traditional approach to
civil case management is the more effective path. A firm
trial/closure date is important as a symbolic end date. The firm
trial/closure date is important under an intrinsic-motivation
model for two reasons. 
First, communicating to the participants that the litigation
process will have a definite end serves the procedural-justice
element of engendering trust. In the current environment, the
participants need to know the court is sensitive to the limits of
their resources and the need to conclude litigation. At this
time, participants generally do not have this impression of the
civil-litigation process. 
The second reason is more foundational. Too few judges
and litigation participants appreciate that every litigation
involves a silent partner, the community. The community has
a fundamental interest in having an effective and credible
mechanism for resolving disputes peacefully. Maintaining the
credibility of the court system for resolving civil disputes is
critical. A court system that permits—or worse, encourages—
Sisyphusian endless litigation does not provide its community
with a credible means of peaceful dispute resolution and
thereby destabilizes that community. Charles Dickens did not
describe the Jarndyce v. Jarndyce lawsuit in Bleak House as an
ode to the credibility of the English Court of Chancery. He
used this example of protracted and self-consuming litigation
as a scathing indictment of the court system and the damage it
did to the community.
Judges managing civil cases must remain mindful that they
not only owe a duty of effective and efficient resolution of cases
to the direct participants, they owe the community a duty of
maintaining the availability to all of a credible means of resolv-
ing disputes, whether large or small. Ultimately, this is the role
of the courts. The courts provide a safety valve to a community
by providing a credible method of resolving individual disputes
peacefully. A community that does not have a credible institu-
tion for resolving disputes peacefully is not sustainable.
Therefore, the judge should set a trial/closure date as early
in the case as possible. The procedural-justice variation on this
guidance is that the judge must give the participants voice in
the setting of the case schedule and trial date (or other proce-
dural closure date if a trial is not required). More importantly,
the judge must make sure the participants felt heard in the set-
ting of the schedule, even if their proposal was not adopted. 
To satisfy procedural fairness, the judge should conduct the
trial/closure-date selection live when the schedule for the case
is set. I started on the bench with a very experienced clerk. She
had a host of rules and tactics to deal with traditional telephone
trial settings and approached them as a battle of wills. (Never
give a trial date beyond X months. Never give more than three
trial dates. Know that they will always take the last date given.
At the first sign of a problem, threaten them with involving the
judge. After X follow-up calls or Y days, make them talk to the
judge or pick a date for them.) She was usually a gentle and per-
suasive “closer,” yet she still spent considerable time on the
chore of setting trial dates. I then spent considerable time on
the disputes or requests to reset that followed. We shifted to a
procedural-justice approach to trial settings, and I handled
them live at the initial status conference. Suddenly, the process
reduced to a few minutes of my time and mere seconds for my
clerk. Eventually, I learned to ask the lawyers to propose target
dates before I offered dates. I was consistently surprised how
frequently they agreed on trial targets sooner than I had
planned to force on them. I remember one contract dispute
where they agreed to set trial in two months at a conference
held one month after the case was filed.
Once the trial date is selected, the judge faces an often
nerve-wracking challenge. Nearly every court is required to set
a trailing trial docket, which creates a tension between keeping
trial dates and the knowledge that only one case can be tried at
a time. The principles of intrinsic motivation tell us that a
forthright and candid discussion with the participants at the
outset is the right approach. Statistically, a judge could set as
many as 20 cases for trial on a given day and still have high
confidence that only one will need to go to trial. We usually set
eight per trial day. I would then explain to the participants that
the court would move heaven and earth to give them their trial
date, to include finding another judge if available at the last
minute. I then explained, truthfully, that after six years han-
dling a civil docket, I had never once continued a civil trial for
lack of judicial resources to try it on schedule. I went on to
explain that because of volume, continuing a trial would
inevitably happen someday. I then explained how I would
decide which case would be continued (greatest need would
go, not oldest) and why I could not make that decision until
the last moment. Motions to continue trial dates all but disap-
peared. Calls to my clerk asking, “where do we stand?” on the
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trial docket also largely disappeared. The research behind pro-
cedural justice likely explains why.
Subsequent Case-Management Conferences. At the conclu-
sion of the initial case-management conference, the judge must
decide if scheduled follow-up conferences will be needed. If a
critical piece of information is expected from a third party or a
largely dispositive motion is to be resolved by a certain time,
the judge should consider setting a status conference just after
that key date to help keep the case moving. While a useful tool,
relatively few civil cases will actually require these. However,
the offer alone from the bench helps define a culture of
engaged problem solving.
Ban Written Discovery and Procedural Motions. At the ini-
tial case-management conference, the judge should explain
that no party may file a discovery or procedural motion until
conferring live with the other lawyer(s) and then collectively
conferring with the judge. The judge must then commit to be
available for such a call quickly, say within two business days
of getting it. The strategies section includes a discussion of this
approach. The following is a transcript of a typical discovery
conference.
Judge: Counsel, how can I help you today?
Jones: I have not received financial records we
requested, and we cannot proceed with our expert’s work
without them. With our schedule, we need those records
by next week.
Smith: The request was dramatically overbroad and
seeks highly sensitive and irrelevant records.
Judge: Ms. Jones, why does your client want these
records?
Jones: We need to know what business they’ve actually
been doing over the years.
Judge: Why do you need these records? What specific
information are you seeking?
Jones: We need to confirm their claim that they did $1
million in business through six orders with Company X.
My client does not trust the disclosure, so we need to see
the P&L to be sure they are telling us everything. Judge,
this is a damages and credibility issue, and the records are
clearly within the scope of discovery.
Judge: Mr. Smith, why is your client opposing this dis-
covery?
Smith: We have given them everything they are enti-
tled to in disclosures, and we’ve told them about the
orders. They are asking for our entire financial records,
and that is highly confidential information. They are in
direct competition with us, and we’re not willing to pro-
vide that information.
Judge: Ms. Jones explains that her client wants to con-
firm the disclosure made in the pleading with original
records. If you have already disclosed it, would those
records still be confidential? Why wouldn’t your client
provide that confirmation?
Smith: We don’t oppose giving copies of confirming
source documents. But, judge, they asked for our P&L.
The P&L doesn’t even show the individual orders. And
it obviously shows the overall economics of our com-
pany, which is confidential and not within the scope of
discovery.
Judge: Does your client
have documents such as
work orders, invoices, and
payment records that would
confirm the disclosure in the
pleading?
Smith: Yes, and we can
make those available.
Judge: Ms. Jones, would
that get your client the infor-
mation he needs?
Jones: Judge, we don’t
trust that they will give us
everything, but that would be a good start. These parties
were partners, and there is a great deal of bad blood
between them. We’d want to verify if they told us the sun
rose in the morning.
Judge: Ms. Jones, is there someone at defendant’s oper-
ation that your client does trust?
Jones: My client trusts Ms. Donaldson in accounting.
Smith: I’m sure my client would agree to have Ms.
Donaldson do the search and gather the records for pro-
duction. She could also provide an affidavit attesting that
these are all the transactions with Company X.
Jones: That would get us what we need.
Judge: When can we get this done?
Smith: By Friday.
Jones: That would be acceptable.
Judge: Thank you, counsel, for your work resolving
this issue.
Whether procedural, discovery, or even substantive law,
these conferences follow a simple formula. The judge should
plan to get the participants together live for a “real time” dis-
cussion rather than by filings. The judge should find out the
purpose behind each side’s action, whether it is a request or an
objection. Usually, a solution presents itself to the participants.
On rare occasions, an issue will have to be decided by the
judge. In most cases, the judge will have sufficient information
to make the decision right then. If not, a narrowly tailored
schedule can be set to get the judge any information or mate-
rials needed to allow a decision.
Expand the Ban to Substantive Motions. Once the judge has
established that no discovery or procedural motion may be filed
until after the movant has consulted with the other side and
discussed it with the judge, the judge should consider expand-
ing that procedure to all motions. The substantive briefing that
results will be much more focused and useful to the judge.
Re-Purpose the Duty to Confer and ADR Obligation. At
the initial case-management conference when the judge dis-
cusses her motions procedure, the judge should use the
chance to re-iterate her expectations of a collaborative
approach to managing the case. She should explain that the
participants are required to confer before bringing any issue to
the court. In her usual explanation that a live discussion is
required, the judge should go one step further to explain the
purpose of the obligation to confer. She can explain that this
obligation to confer is expressed in two ways. First, the
lawyers must discuss any disagreement before asking the
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Only later, as we sought to understand what was happening, did
we turn to the behavioral sciences for enlightenment. 
court to help. Second, the named
parties must pursue some form of
alternate dispute resolution. She
should explain that these should
not be seen as requirements that
people compromise. Instead, they
are requirements by the court that
the parties refine, narrow, and
understand their disputes so they
can be efficient in bringing them to
the court for resolution. The judge
should impose these obligations for
purely selfish reasons, to cut 50 pages of briefing down to the
core 6 pages actually needed. 
The judge must also help each party see the discussion
obligation for the purely self-interested value it offers. These
discussions are an opportunity for each participant to refine
and understand their dispute. Discussing the potential sum-
mary-judgment motion with the opponent allows the lawyer to
understand which elements are really in dispute, what the
other side’s arguments are, and how best to structure his own
brief and argument. The cost of that briefing may easily be cut
in half by a thorough discussion with the opposing side. More
importantly, the effectiveness of that briefing may be increased
exponentially by the same discussion. Mediation should be
seen as an opportunity to test each side’s arguments with an
experienced neutral and refine that argument based on the
feedback received. If these discussions result in an acceptable
and economic settlement of the issue or case, all the better.
Young lawyers and parties new to the court system find these
explanations particularly insightful and helpful. What they
often see as a requirement based on the judge’s desire to avoid
making a decision and an inappropriate effort to force the par-
ties to compromise suddenly becomes a valuable opportunity.
Trial-Management Conference. The judge should conduct a
live trial-management conference shortly before the trial. The
judge should use her intrinsic-motivation tools to define the
issues and flow of the trial as well as to establish the proce-
dures for the different aspects of trial.
Finally, Set Standards for Yourself as Well. Succeeding in
effective and efficient case management is not merely a matter
of setting and maintaining expectations for the lawyers; the
judge has to have high standards as well. First, the judge must
commit his staff to answering the telephone whenever possible
and returning messages within one business day in all other
cases. A common complaint among lawyers in many states is
that the court’s telephone is never answered, and voicemails
are not returned for several days. If the judge expects the
lawyers to be responsive to his team, the judge’s team needs to
be responsive to the lawyers. Second, the judge must commit
to resolving the distractions on an expedited basis and carving
out time to do so even when inconvenient—short-term pain
for long-term gain. The judge must also commit to ruling on
fully briefed issues on a timely basis. 
We published a standard order advising all counsel that if an
issue had been fully briefed and no ruling was received within
30 days, the movant was directed to contact the division clerk
to advise us, as well as to file a pleading. This was done to
demonstrate a commitment to timely rulings and to relieve the
angst felt by lawyers with a need for a ruling debating whether
to risk the wrath of the judge or clerk by calling to ask for one.
While I was annoyed the first few times a law office called four
days after 150 pages of briefing had closed asking for a ruling,
I soon realized it was a compliment that we had the docket
running so efficiently that experienced lawyers actually
expected rulings from this division that quickly.
A PATH FORWARD
For those readers that skipped section II because the behav-
ioral-sciences discussion sounded too soft and fuzzy, now is
the time to go back and read it. The goal of this article is not
just to provide the judge with yet another package of case-
management tactics that sound vaguely promising. The goal of
this article is to change fundamentally our entire approach to
litigation management. For decades, judges, litigators, and
commentators have approached civil case management as an
exercise in subduing spiraling costs and incivility. The domi-
nant paradigm is that extrinsic control is the answer. This par-
adigm has largely been based on the instincts of a control-
based culture (the law) akin to Hobbes’ Leviathan. The surface-
level purpose of this article is to propose shifting from an
extrinsic-control philosophy of litigation management to a
philosophy of self-regulation based on an intrinsic model of
management and the principles of procedural justice. 
The more fundamental purpose of this article is to propose
that future civil litigation management should be based on
research that explains human behavior—and how to manage
it. Over the last several decades, litigation-management reform
efforts have been based largely on instincts and anecdotes.63
When empirical data have been referenced, it has generally
been symptomatic research rather than root-cause research:
Litigation expenses and delays were studied and tactics were
developed to suppress those unwanted symptoms. However,
litigation managers have rarely looked beyond unwanted
symptoms to the behavioral sciences to understand causes.
Only by looking to core causes can a system achieve meaning-
ful progress in improving the process of litigation as well as
enhancing the quality of the substantive result (distributive
justice). Our colleagues in problem-solving courts have
pointed the way to a new path to conflict management and res-
olution by stepping outside the lore of the law and gaining
insights from the solid research of behavioral science and
insights from that analogous world of enterprise/project man-
agement. The core hypothesis of this article is that future civil-
case-management reform should be based on empirical
research explaining human behavior first and accounting stud-
ies of the litigation process second. 
Two potential bridges exist between the old approach to lit-
igation management and the approach proposed here. First is
the problem-solving-court movement. Problem-solving courts
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have evolved dramatically in the last decade and are on the edge
of becoming mainstream approaches to substance abuse in
many spheres. These courts have more than a decade of experi-
ence in applying the knowledge of the behavioral sciences to
the court system. Judges and other personnel in problem-solv-
ing courts have worked through the challenges of applying the
concepts of procedural justice to the real world. Many of these
judges have also learned how to digest material from the very
different world of behavioral science. More importantly, the
political and social interest in criminal-justice progress has
meant extensive, well-funded studies have been done of what
works and does not work in problem-solving courts. Any judge
interested in making meaningful progress in any form of litiga-
tion management should seek the insights offered by our col-
leagues in the world of problem-solving courts.
The second bridge is the current trend in the dialogue about
civil case management. In this article, I have used the word
“trend” in the statistician’s sense of the word, a tendency or
direction shown over time or data points—in this case, the
pursuit of an extrinsic-control model in various forms over
several decades. However, the term also has a pop-culture
meaning of the very latest idea being discussed—what’s hot.
What’s hot among many commentators on civil case manage-
ment is a budding movement called “proportionality.” The pro-
ponents of “proportionality” advocate the need to focus the lit-
igation at the outset through active judicial involvement. They
also promote the need to eliminate distracting litigation steps
that have become rote and serve little productive purpose.
Additionally, the Rule 1 project of the Institute for the
Advancement of the American Legal System (“IAALS”) calls
for empirically based efforts to improve the civil justice system.
IAALS is a vocal proponent of proportionality.
Proportionality’s focus on an engaged judge that tailors dis-
covery to individual case needs could serve as an excellent
training ground for judges. Proportionality is, nonetheless,
merely a means in service of a larger end. If the end being pur-
sued is creating a new tactic serving an extrinsic model that
seeks only to make litigation a faster and cheaper road to trial,
it will achieve little more than the “rocket docket” or “differ-
ential case management” have achieved. To use Daniel Pink’s
taxonomy, we need to move to Motivation 3.0 rather than just
refine the existing model to Motivation 2.1.64 If proportional-
ity is viewed as a stepping stone to gain the skills needed to
implement a genuine intrinsic-motivation model (Motivation
3.0) as discussed here, it can be the pathway to dramatic
improvements in litigation management and gains in commu-
nity confidence in our court system. 
Every litigation involves a silent partner: the community.
The community has a fundamental interest in having a mech-
anism for delivering dispute resolutions. This mechanism
must be credible. For our purposes, that community credibil-
ity has two components. First and foremost, it must be effec-
tive—meaning that it is accepted by the participants and the
community as a fair result that actually resolves the issue. Sec-
ond, it must be delivered efficiently—if justice is only available
to a well-funded few or after interminable delay, the delivery
system is not a credible mecha-
nism for the community. 
Judges managing civil cases
must remain mindful that they
not only owe a duty of effective
and efficient resolution of cases
to the direct participants, they
owe the community a duty of
maintaining the availability to
all of a credible means of resolv-
ing disputes fairly, whether large
or small. Ultimately, this is the
role of the courts. The courts
provide a safety valve to a com-
munity by providing a credible
method of resolving individual
disputes fairly and peacefully. A community that does not have
a credible institution for resolving disputes fairly and peace-
fully is not sustainable.
A pernicious result of the decades-long drift in our civil lit-
igation system is the corrosive effects of large numbers of
clients settling cases based exclusively on the costs of litiga-
tion. When expense—rather than the merits of a dispute—is
consistently the driving motive in dispute resolution, the sys-
tem ceases to function as a credible mechanism for the com-
munity to resolve disputes. Without a credible means of reach-
ing peaceful dispute resolution, the community must eventu-
ally cease to function.
The converse is also true. If the system’s primary focus
becomes cheap-and-fast resolutions where perceived justice
and fairness suffer, the system again lacks credibility. If cheaper
and faster are the primary goals, one might as well install a
computer terminal using a random-number generator to
resolve civil disputes.
The strong trend in recent decades to move civil litigation
to alternate-dispute-resolution systems is the greatest claxon
calling us to change our approach. Arbitration is the most
common alternate, and it is a system with few procedural or
substantive protections for achieving distributive justice. Also,
the degree of quality one gets in arbitration is heavily influ-
enced by one’s economic resources—not a healthy trend in a
nation founded on the goal of equal access to justice for all.
People are not flocking to the benefits of arbitration; they are
fleeing the negatives of our current litigation process. 
I do not believe these are signs of a dispute-resolution sys-
tem that is structurally wrong—i.e., that our adversarial system
is the wrong model. My confidence in the basic design of our
court system has never been stronger. Instead, I think they are
signs that our approach to managing the human beings in our
court system suffers a basic philosophical flaw—the pursuit of
an extrinsic-command-and-control model instead of an intrin-
sic-motivation model. Reform cannot focus merely on reduc-
ing the costs and delays of delivering distributive justice; it
must do so while serving the participants’ need for procedural
justice, or it will continue to suffer a systemic lack of credibil-
ity. The path ahead is the intrinsic model. 
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CONCLUSION
Criticism of the inefficiencies and delays within the current
civil litigation system is widespread. Many tactics have been
tried in recent years to ameliorate the perceived negative char-
acteristics of our litigation system—suppress distracting dis-
covery and motion disputes as well as uncivil conduct by
lawyers while pushing cases to move faster to trial. Nonethe-
less, dissatisfaction with civil litigation remains widespread in
the community as well as among participants. Prior civil-liti-
gation-management efforts have clung to a traditional enter-
prise-management philosophy based on extrinsic command
and control. A new approach is needed.
Many have recognized that the time is ripe for a significant
change in how we manage civil litigation. For example, a pri-
mary reason IAALS exists is to improve our system. The Con-
ference of Chief Justices adopted a resolution in late 2011
encouraging pilot projects to improve civil case management.
The question is what will drive the next revision to civil case
management.
Civil-litigation-management reformers should take their
cue from their colleagues in the problem-solving-court move-
ment. They should look beyond the traditions of the legal sec-
tor for insights. They should move beyond asking what parts
of the current civil litigation system we want to suppress and
ask the broader questions of what drives human behavior and
how we can use that knowledge to make our litigation system
work better. They should look to the empirical data available
in the behavioral sciences. That data, most accessible to the
legal professional through the procedural-justice movement,
tell us that we should move to an intrinsic model of litigation
management.
An intrinsic or engagement-based model will eliminate or
minimize distractions, reduce resources required for each case,
reduce caseloads by achieving faster resolutions, and free
judges to provide more thoughtful and well-crafted rulings. An
intrinsic model will also increase participant acceptance of and
satisfaction with the resolution ultimately reached. 
By engagement through an intrinsic model, judges can
achieve efficient and effective case resolutions that still deliver
just results. Moreover, management by engagement will
increase the parties’ satisfaction with the case results and, cor-
respondingly, increase the public’s confidence in our court sys-
tem. So, engage today.
David Prince is the Deputy Chief Judge for the
Fourth Judicial District, State of Colorado.
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national practice. He was one of the founders of
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brings to the bench more than two decades of
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1. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
2. Id. at 1477.
3. Id. Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion of the court,
joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Ginsberg, Justice Breyer, and
Justice Sotomayor. Justice Alito concurred, joined by Justice
Roberts, and Justice Scalia authored a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Thomas joined. Id. at 1477, 1487, 1494.
4. Id. at 1477–78.
5. Id. at 1478 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482,
483 (Ky. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
A noncitizen charged with a criminal offense faces adual risk of serious consequences: in addition to thesentence that could be imposed as a result of his crim-
inal conviction, a noncitizen defendant may also face severe
immigration consequences, including removal from the United
States, if he is convicted of a crime. We recommend that trial
court judges advise noncitizen defendants of the potential
immigration consequences of their criminal convictions so
that immigrants are fully informed of their rights. In section I,
we first explain the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Padilla v. Kentucky, which held that attorneys must advise their
clients of the immigration consequences of their convictions.
We demonstrate that trial court judges have a similar duty to
advise noncitizen defendants because they have always played
a role in ensuring effective assistance of counsel and ensuring
knowing and voluntary pleas.
In section II, we summarize the areas of immigration law in
which a criminal conviction or the sentence imposed by a trial
court judge can have serious implications for noncitizens. In
section III, we examine the various approaches currently
taken by states that have imposed a statutory duty on judges
to advise noncitizens about the immigration consequences of
their convictions. Based on an analysis of the strengths and
weaknesses of these statutory advisements, we present a
model judicial advisement in section IV that ensures a non-
immigrant defendant receives adequate advice and is fully
informed about the potential immigration consequences of a
criminal conviction.
I. TRIAL COURT JUDGES’ DUTY TO UPHOLD 
DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS INCLUDES PROTECTING THE
RIGHT TO ACCURATE, INFORMED IMMIGRATION
INFORMATION
In this section, we examine the role of trial court judges when
noncitizen criminal defendants appear before them. This section
starts by addressing the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, which created affirmative obliga-
tions for defense attorneys to advise their clients regarding the
immigration consequences of criminal convictions. Next, we
demonstrate that trial court judges have a similar duty based on
their preexisting duties to ensure effective assistance of counsel
and to ensure guilty pleas are knowing and voluntary.
A. PADILLA V. KENTUCKY: IMMIGRANT DEFENDANTS
HAVE A RIGHT TO KNOW ABOUT POTENTIAL
REMOVAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
The United States Supreme Court decision in Padilla v. Ken-
tucky clarified defense counsel’s obligations with respect to
immigration advice but left open the question of judges’ roles
in ensuring noncitizen defendants understand the immigration
consequences of their criminal convictions. We recommend
that judges should also play a role in advising immigrants of
the consequences of their criminal convictions based on
judges’ preexisting obligations to protect the due-process
rights of criminal defendants.
1. Padilla v. Kentucky: Facts and Holding
In 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided Padilla v.
Kentucky, which held that criminal defense attorneys are
required to advise their clients of the potential immigration
consequences of their guilty pleas.1 Jose Padilla was a lawful
permanent resident and native of Honduras who had been
legally present in the United States for 40 years.2 Mr. Padilla
was also a veteran of the Vietnam War, a fact the Supreme
Court noted in the first paragraph of its opinion.3 Mr. Padilla
was charged with transporting a large quantity of marijuana in
his trailer and pled guilty on the basis of his attorney’s erro-
neous advice.4 His attorney advised him to plead guilty
because the attorney believed that Mr. Padilla “did not have to
worry about immigration status since he had been in the coun-
try so long.”5 This advice was, unfortunately, incorrect. The
federal Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) dictates that
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deportable.”).
7. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
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14. Id. at 1480.
15. Id. at 1486 (“[W]e now hold that counsel must inform her client
whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Our longstanding
Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a
consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of
deportation on families living lawfully in this country demand no
less.”).
16. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
17. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1483. (“This is not a hard case in which to
find deficiency: The consequences of Padilla’s plea could easily be
determined from reading the removal statute, his deportation was
presumptively mandatory, and his counsel’s advice was incor-
rect.”).
18. Id. at 1484.
19. See IMMIGRANT DEFENSE PROJECT & NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS AFTER
PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 12 (2011) [hereinafter JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS],
available at http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/05/postpadillaFINALnew.pdf.
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an alien who is convicted of a controlled-substance violation is
automatically subject to removal.6
As a result of his conviction following his guilty plea, Mr.
Padilla was placed in removal proceedings. He raised a post-
conviction challenge to his criminal conviction, alleging that
his attorney’s incorrect advice amounted to ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.7 The Supreme Court of Kentucky denied Mr.
Padilla’s claim without a hearing, holding that removal was a
mere “collateral consequence” of a criminal conviction and
therefore did not fall under the purview of the Sixth Amend-
ment’s effective-assistance doctrine.8 Under the collateral-con-
sequences doctrine, a defendant must make a plea with full
knowledge of the direct consequences of his conviction in order
to satisfy due process.9 If a defendant makes a plea and is
unaware of the collateral consequences, however, the plea still
withstands constitutional scrutiny.10 On appeal, the United
States Supreme Court held that effective assistance of counsel
requires an attorney to advise her client whether a criminal con-
viction carries a risk of removal.11 The Court held that the col-
lateral-consequences doctrine did not apply to severe immigra-
tion consequences, such as removal from the United States.
Instead, the Court summarily concluded that the Sixth Amend-
ment itself requires affirmative immigration advice.12
The Court referenced recent changes in immigration law,
noting that the system had evolved from one that allowed trial
court judges to influence which convictions would result in
removal to one that requires automatic removal as the result of
many criminal convictions.13 The Court stated that these
“changes to our immigration law have dramatically raised the
stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction.”14 In light of these
serious consequences, the Court concluded that counsel’s fail-
ure to provide immigration advice could constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.15
The test for ineffective assistance of counsel was set forth in
a 1984 United States Supreme Court case, Strickland v. Wash-
ington. Strickland states that for a defendant to prove he
received ineffective assistance of counsel, he must prove first
that his counsel’s performance was deficient, and second, that
but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the case
would have been different.16 In the specific context of Mr.
Padilla’s case, the Court concluded under Strickland’s first
prong that counsel’s performance was deficient. The Court
stated that the consequence of automatic removal resulting
from a conviction of transporting marijuana was clear from the
plain text of the immigration statute and that counsel was
therefore deficient for failing to advise his client of that fact.17
With regard to Strickland’s second prong, the court remanded to
the lower Kentucky courts to determine whether Mr. Padilla
would not have pled guilty but for his counsel’s erroneous state-
ment that he would suffer no immigration consequences.18
2. What Padilla Requires from Attorneys
Before Padilla, state courts and the United States Courts of
Appeals had split on the issue of whether defense counsel had
a duty to advise his client of the immigration consequences of
a guilty plea or conviction.19 Despite attempting to standardize
and clarify defense counsel’s duty with respect to immigration
advice, the Padilla opinion did not address how specific
defense counsel’s advice must be.20
Under the specific facts of Padilla, the Court stated that Mr.
Padilla’s attorney should have advised him that a guilty plea
would have resulted in removal because the immigration
statute at issue was clear that any controlled-substance viola-
tion triggered automatic removability.21 The Court was less
forceful, however, in declaring the type of advice that would be
required in other scenarios.22 Acknowledging that immigration
law is “complex” and “a legal specialty of its own,” the Court
opined that when the immigration consequences of a convic-
tion were less certain than in Mr. Padilla’s case, a defense attor-
ney would not be required to provide a detailed warning on the
specific immigration consequences.23 Instead, in those scenar-
ios, “a criminal defense attorney need do no more than advise
a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a
risk of adverse immigration consequences.”24
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Justice Alito concurred in the judgment but disagreed that
defense attorneys should have an affirmative duty to provide
immigration advice.25 Rather, he stated his belief that counsel
should either refrain from giving any immigration advice at all
or provide noncitizen clients with a general warning of poten-
tial immigration consequences while encouraging them to
consult an immigration attorney for specific advice.26 The
majority opinion rejected this approach, citing the “absurd”
effect it would have of incentivizing attorneys to remain silent
on immigration matters, even where accurate and rudimentary
immigration advice was readily available.27 The majority’s
rejection of Justice Alito’s approach demonstrates the Court’s
concern that noncitizens receive accurate and informed advice
and militates in favor of judicial advisements in addition to
those provided by attorneys.
Padilla makes clear that although defense attorneys are not
expected to become immigration-law experts, they are
expected to research the relevant immigration statutes and
apply settled caselaw when giving their clients immigration
advice. In contrast to this affirmative duty on attorneys, the
Court did not explicitly address the role of trial court judges in
advising noncitizen defendants. The next section explains why
trial court judges should also take steps to uphold noncitizens’
rights.
B. WHY PADILLA REQUIRES TRIAL COURT JUDGES TO
ENSURE NONCITIZEN DEFENDANTS ARE
INFORMED ABOUT THE IMMIGRATION 
CONSEQUENCES OF A CONVICTION
The Padilla opinion was clear with respect to the fact that
defense attorneys have an affirmative duty to provide immi-
gration advice, even though it is not entirely certain how spe-
cific this advice must be. For judges presiding over criminal
prosecutions of noncitizens, however, the implications of
Padilla were less explicit. This section will examine judges’
preexisting duties to protect defendants’ rights. We conclude
that these preexisting duties, combined with the Court’s con-
cern for noncitizen defendants as expressed in Padilla, require
trial court judges to take steps to protect noncitizen defen-
dants, including advising them of their rights and the risk of
removal.
1. Trial Court Judges’ Preexisting Duty to Ensure 
Effective Assistance of Counsel Includes the Right to
Accurate Immigration Advice
In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court
recognized the right to the effective assistance of counsel for all
criminal defendants.28 Strickland set a high bar for criminal
defendants attempting to allege their trial counsel was ineffec-
tive.29 In the context of a plea, Strickland requires a showing
that the defendant would have chosen to proceed to trial rather
than pleading guilty, but for his counsel’s deficient advice.30
The trial judge is responsible for ensuring that criminal
defendants receive due process of law, including verifying that
a defendant is aware of all her Sixth Amendment rights and
that counsel is performing effectively.31 Appellate judges see
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal appeals.
Now, under Padilla, the Sixth Amendment right to effective
counsel includes accurate advice on the removal consequences
of a criminal conviction,32 meaning that trial and appellate
judges must also be concerned about whether counsel is com-
plying with this new requirement.33
This concern for a noncitizen defendant’s right to accurate
immigration advice may arise in a number of different scenar-
ios. For example, trial court judges need to consider defense
counsel’s ability to provide immigration advice when appoint-
ing counsel to an indigent defendant who faces immigration
consequences as the result of a conviction.34 Furthermore, even
for non-appointed counsel, an attorney’s general ability to pro-
vide competent immigration advice is an important aspect of
the Sixth Amendment following the Padilla decision. We rec-
ommend that judges ensure defense counsel’s ability to provide
accurate immigration advice by asking the attorney whether he
feels he can properly advise his client on the immigration con-
sequences of a conviction. Trial court judges cannot inquire
into the exact nature of immigration advice an attorney gives
his client, however, because of attorney–client confidentiality.35
Furthermore, the Padilla mandate presents a special con-
cern for noncitizen defendants who are not entitled to an
appointed attorney. The United States Supreme Court has
determined which indigent defendants are entitled to an
appointed attorney in a set of three cases, Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, Scott v. Illinois, and Alabama v. Shelton.36 These cases state
that an indigent criminal defendant charged with a misde-
meanor is not entitled to appointed counsel if he does not
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receive jail time for his sentence.37 The United States Supreme
Court has not addressed what happens when an indigent crim-
inal defendant is charged with a non-jailable offense that may
nevertheless lead to his removal.38 Given the Padilla Court’s
concern for noncitizens, we recommend that trial court judges
err on the side of protecting noncitizens’ rights by appointing
counsel to indigent defendants charged with non-jailable
offenses that carry the risk of removal.
2. When Defendants Can Challenge Inaccurate 
Immigration Advice Given Before Padilla
At the time Padilla was decided, it was not clear whether it
applied to pre-2010 criminal convictions. Lower courts split
on the issue of whether Padilla should have retroactive effect,
but in a 2013 case, Chaidez v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court clarified that it read Padilla to apply only
prospectively.39 The Court applied the test of retroactivity set
forth in Teague v. Lane. The Teague retroactivity test states that
new rules of criminal procedure apply prospectively, while
mere clarifications of existing law are given retroactive effect.40
The Court concluded that Padilla announced a new rule
because the Padilla Court first had to determine whether
immigration advice even fell within the ambit of the Sixth
Amendment.41 The Court stated that Padilla was the first time
that a court had recognized counsel’s affirmative duty to pro-
vide accurate immigration advice, despite the fact that many
states already required trial courts to ensure counsel had
advised his client on the immigration consequences of a plea.42
The Court held that Padilla did not have retroactive effect
based on its conclusion that requiring defense attorneys to
advise their clients on immigration matters was a new rule.43
Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg authored a strong dissent
in Chaidez, asserting that Padilla “did nothing more than apply
the existing rule of Strickland” to the new scenario of defective
immigration advice.44 The dissent cited other cases in which
Strickland’s application to new factual situations did not trigger
prospective-only application45 and noted that professional
norms regarding immigration advice had evolved with the
changing stakes of immigration law to require accurate immi-
gration advice even before the Padilla decision.46
Despite the majority opinion in Chaidez declining to
retroactively apply Padilla, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts has decided to give Padilla retroactive effect
within Massachusetts.47 Before the United States Supreme
Court’s ruling in Chaidez, the Massachusetts high court had
decided that Padilla should have retroactive effect.48 After the
Chaidez decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
affirmed that it would continue to apply Padilla retroactively
by deciding Commonwealth v. Sylvain.49 In Sylvain, the defen-
dant pled guilty in 2007 to a drug charge based on his attor-
ney’s erroneous advice that he would not be removed as a con-
sequence.50 The issue in Sylvain was whether the defendant
should be permitted to bring a Padilla claim despite the fact his
conviction predated the Padilla decision.51 The Massachusetts
high court affirmed its prior decision and re-stated that Padilla
should apply retroactively despite the United States Supreme
Court’s ruling to the contrary in Chaidez.52 The court relied on
its ability to independently apply the Teague framework in
determining whether a constitutional criminal-procedure rule
should have retroactive effect or not.53 Under its independent
application of Teague, the Massachusetts court sided with the
Chaidez dissent in concluding that Padilla did not announce a
new rule of criminal procedure and therefore had retroactive
effect.54 The court also held that the Massachusetts constitu-
tion independently required accurate immigration advice and
that Padilla therefore did not announce a new rule under either
the federal or state constitutions.55
The Sylvain decision opened up the possibility that other
state courts might choose to apply Padilla retroactively in spite
of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Chaidez.56 For
example, the New Mexico Supreme Court recently permitted
the New Mexico Legal Academics and the National Immigra-
tion Project of the National Lawyers Guild to file an amicus
brief on the question of Padilla retroactivity.57 A Padilla-
retroactivity case is also pending in New York.58
The United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Padilla and
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the divergent approaches to retroactivity taken by the nation’s
high court and state courts leave this an area of flux. It is pos-
sible that in the coming months and years, other states will fol-
low Massachusetts’s lead and elect to apply Padilla retroac-
tively under either an independent application of Teague or on
state constitutional grounds. We recommend that trial court
judges ensure noncitizen defendants’ rights are protected in all
future cases to avoid unnecessary appeals implicating Padilla.
3. Trial Court Judges Must Ensure Noncitizen 
Defendants Are Aware of the Immigration 
Consequences of Pleading Guilty
Trial court judges presiding over criminal proceedings will
frequently encounter noncitizen defendants who want to enter
a plea of guilty rather than proceeding to trial. Due process and
many state and federal rules of criminal procedure place an
affirmative duty on judges to ensure that guilty pleas are made
knowingly and voluntarily. After Padilla, the trial court should
verify that a defendant is aware of the immigration conse-
quences of a conviction before allowing the defendant to enter
a guilty plea. For example, the New York Court of Appeals
recently decided People v. Diaz, which held that as a matter of
due process, the trial court is required to advise a noncitizen
defendant that a criminal conviction may result in removal
from the United States.59 We recommend that all trial court
judges follow New York’s lead and ensure noncitizen defen-
dants are fully informed before pleading guilty.
a. Basic Principles of Due-Process Fairness Require
Advising Defendants of Potential Immigration 
Consequences of Pleading Guilty
The Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments
require that no defendant be deprived of life or liberty without
due process of law.60 For trial judges, this means ensuring that
criminal defendants are aware that pleading guilty to a crime
constitutes a waiver of certain rights and that defendants
undertake such a waiver with full knowledge of its conse-
quences. Rules of criminal procedure in various jurisdictions
may also require certain safeguards to protect a defendant’s
rights during a plea proceeding.61 Padilla itself was silent on
whether its holding extended to require trial judges to deter-
mine a defendant’s awareness of immigration consequences
before accepting a guilty plea. However, the Padilla Court
emphasized the severity of removal as a consequence of a crim-
inal conviction and placed an affirmative duty on defense
counsel to advise a criminal defendant on immigration conse-
quences before the defendant accepts a plea.62 Padilla’s impli-
cations for trial judges during a plea colloquy are complicated
by the Court’s refusal to classify immigration consequences as
either collateral or direct, but given the Court’s acknowledg-
ment that immigration advice is essential information and that
removal is a serious consequence, we recommend that judges
ensure defendants are aware of the immigration consequences
of their guilty pleas.63
b. Trial Court Judges Should Advise Defendants of the Risk
of Removal, Despite the Padilla Court’s Unwillingness to
Label Removal a “Direct Consequence” of a Criminal
Conviction
Courts have struggled to determine what information due
process requires a defendant to know and understand before
entering a guilty plea. In Brady v. United States, the United
States Supreme Court determined that a defendant must make
a guilty plea with a full understanding of the direct conse-
quences of his plea.64 In Hill v. Lockhart, the Court clarified
that a plea made without full understanding of the collateral
consequences could nevertheless be voluntary, as long as the
direct consequences of the plea were made clear.65 This collat-
eral/direct distinction led courts to debate what qualifies as a
direct, as opposed to collateral, consequence of a criminal con-
viction.66 Before Padilla, a number of state courts and United
States Courts of Appeals had applied the collateral-conse-
quences doctrine to the immigration consequences of a guilty
plea and concluded that immigration consequences were col-
lateral.67
Padilla itself did not explicitly state whether immigration
consequences fell under the ambit of due process required
when courts accept guilty pleas. Rather than declaring that
immigration consequences are direct consequences of a guilty
plea, the Court declined to apply the direct/collateral frame-
work at all.68 Although the court did not define removal as a
“direct” consequence, it nevertheless acknowledged the sever-
ity of removal and the importance of accurate immigration
advice.69 We recommend, therefore, that trial court judges
ensure defendants are aware of the immigration consequences
of their convictions before accepting guilty pleas. 
For trial court judges to be able to assess whether defense
counsel has given accurate immigration advice and defendants
are well-informed when accepting a plea, an understanding of
some aspects of immigration law is necessary. The next section
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turns to the relevant portions of the INA that might be impli-
cated when a trial court convicts and sentences a noncitizen
defendant.
II. FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW DEFINING THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
The federal Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) imposes
statutory consequences for immigrants that have been con-
victed of certain crimes.70 Only an immigration judge may
issue a removal order, but this section illustrates the extent to
which a sentence from a criminal proceeding could have the
added effect of removal from the United States in an immigra-
tion context. This additional consequence makes immigration
concerns very important for criminal sentencing by trial court
judges.
A. OVERVIEW OF A NONCITIZEN’S REMOVAL BY 
IMMIGRATION COURT POST CRIMINAL 
CONVICTION
Immigrants who have been convicted of certain qualifying
crimes are removable from the United States by U.S. Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement (ICE). An immigrant must be
convicted of the crime in order to be found removable by an
immigration judge: a conviction includes all formal judgments
of guilt entered by a court as well as all suspended sentences
following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or where the
defendant has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of
guilt.71 Upon conviction, an individual immigrant will gener-
ally serve her sentence as mandated by the court; when she is
eligible for release from state custody, ICE is notified to take
her into custody under a 48-hour maximum detainer.72 An
immigration detainer (Form I-247) is a request from ICE for
local law enforcement to temporarily hold an immigrant pend-
ing an immigration proceeding or removal.
At this point, removal proceedings may occur: only an
immigration court can issue an order for removal from the
United States.73 An immigration court will compare the crime
the individual has been convicted of with the relevant federal
criminal act, according to the references in the Immigration
and Nationality Act. The court will apply either a categorical
or a modified categorical approach (discussed in subsection C,
below) to determine whether the crime the immigrant has
been convicted of matches the statutory requirements under
federal law that are identified in the INA. If it does, and the
immigrant does not qualify for various forms of relief under
immigration law, the immigration judge may issue an order of
removal or allow the immigrant to leave the country on her
own under “voluntary departure.”74
B. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 
PROVISIONS REGARDING CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
Section 237(a)(2) of the INA outlines various criminal
offenses that make an alien removable in broad categories,
including crimes involving moral turpitude, aggravated
felonies, and other miscellaneous offenses, each of which is
discussed in this subsection.75 These specific offenses make an
immigrant removable under the procedure outlined in subsec-
tion II.A., above. To determine whether a state criminal con-
viction qualifies as a removable offense under federal law, an
immigration judge compares the elements of the state statute
with the generic federal definitions: an immigration judge
looks at the “‘ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning’
of the [criminal] term [indicated by the INA] by looking to the
common law, the contemporary meaning of the term as
expressed in state and federal law, and other respected sources
such as the Model Penal Code.”76 This immigration-court
determination compares state and federal criminal statutes to
ascertain the purpose and scope of removability under the
INA.
In outlining the qualifying crimes that result in removabil-
ity, the INA makes distinctions between the “term of impris-
onment,” “sentence,” and potential sentence that is imposed
on a criminal defendant. A term of imprisonment is defined by
the INA as “the period of incarceration or confinement ordered
by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposi-
tion or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or
in part.”77 This term includes any detention time and the
entirety of the sentence imposed. “Sentence” is used for the
same definition and includes what is ordered by the court
without respect to actual time served by the noncitizen.78 Con-
versely, certain INA provisions condition a removable offense
on the maximum potential sentence available for the crime
under state law.79 Other removable offenses are conditioned on
the time the crime is committed80 or financial minimums of
the crime.81
The subsections of INA 237(a)(2) detail the various other
criminal offenses that result in removal from the United States:
controlled-substance offenses, other than a single offense of
personal possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana;82 convic-
tions that show the immigrant is a drug abuser or addict;83 pos-
session or sale of unlawful firearms or destructive devices;84
crimes related to espionage, sabotage, treason, or sedition;85
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domestic violence, stalking, criminal child abuse, child
neglect, or child abandonment;86 violation of a protection
order related to domestic violence;87 and human trafficking.88
Some alternative qualifications for removability in the INA
are also crimes, even when they are not codified under Section
237(a)(2) of the Act. For example, an immigrant who is pre-
sent in the United States without lawful admission (someone
who has “entered without inspection”) is in violation of the
law but is removable according to Section 237(a)(1)(B) of the
INA.89 Entering into a marriage for the fraudulent purposes of
obtaining immigration benefits90 and document fraud91 are
also crimes located in other subsections of INA Section 237.
However, Section 237(a)(2) of the INA is the proper scope for
trial court judges: this section includes the circumstances
where the conviction of a noncitizen in a criminal court may
be reviewed by an immigration judge for removability. The var-
ious other removable offenses in the INA are generally litigated
only in immigration courts, even when they are also crimes
under federal law.
1. Federal Immigration Definition of “Aggravated
Felony”
Section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the INA makes immigrants that
have been convicted of an aggravated felony removable.92
“Aggravated felony” as an immigration-specific term refers to a
broad class of crimes in federal immigration law, defined in
Section 101(a)(43) of the Act.93 This broad category includes,
among others, murder, rape, theft, crimes of violence against a
person or property, domestic abuse, stalking, trafficking in
drugs or persons, fraud, child pornography, and false docu-
ments.94 Several of these aggravated-felony crimes require that
a “term of imprisonment of at least one year” may be imposed
or set certain minimums for crimes to qualify (such as
“amount of the funds exceeded $10,000.”)95
3. Federal Immigration Definition of “Crimes Involving
Moral Turpitude”
There is no definition of a “crime involving moral turpi-
tude” (CIMT) in the Immigration and Nationality Act or other
federal laws.96 Therefore, the definition of such a crime must
be assessed through judicial interpretation by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.97 A CIMT, defined generally, is one “that
shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or
depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties owed
between persons, either to individuals or society in general.”98
Such a crime “must involve evil or malicious intent or inher-
ent depravity.”99 “Neither the seriousness of the crime nor the
severity of the sentence is determinative of whether a crime is
a crime of moral turpitude.”100 Determining whether a crime
involves moral turpitude requires an examination of the ele-
ments of the crime under a categorical or modified categorical
approach as described in subsection C, below.101 The determi-
nation of construction is driven “by the statutory definition or
by the nature of the crime not by the specific conduct that
resulted in the conviction.”102
Some common examples of crimes involving moral turpi-
tude include: “crime[s] involving intent or reckless behavior to
commit great bodily harm . . . crimes involving an intent to
defraud [theft, fraud, perjury] . . . prostitution . . . [and] money
laundering.”103 A simple case of driving under the influence
(DUI) is not a CIMT, but committing a DUI while knowingly
driving on a license previously revoked for a different DUI is a
CIMT.104 Assault may be a CIMT but only if there is an aggra-
vating factor that is charged.105
C. RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IN 
IMMIGRATION LAW
Following a criminal conviction by a trial court judge, an
immigration judge must determine whether a noncitizen is
removable by comparing her conviction under state law with
the applicable federal law described in the INA. This process of
statutory construction only involves the immigration courts,
but understanding the process may benefit trial judges by
demonstrating the full consequences of a conviction that is
imposed in criminal court. To determine whether a conviction
renders an immigrant removable, the immigration judge uses
either a categorical or modified categorical approach. A cate-
gorical approach requires that “the judge must determine if
there is a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility that
the criminal statute would be applied to reach [removable]
conduct.”106 This categorical approach requires that the full
range of the criminal statute under which an immigrant is con-
victed yields a removable offense under federal law. Therefore,
vague or overbroad statutes that include conduct that does not
result in removability under relevant federal law does not yield
immigration consequences. A modified categorical approach
allows the reviewing immigration judge to conduct a limited
examination of the record to determine whether the elements
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of the state crime demonstrate removability.107 The limited
examination of the record of conviction may include “docu-
ments such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury
instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript.”108
A series of decisions by the United States Supreme Court in
summer 2013 clarified the approach to rules of construction
regarding criminal convictions that carry immigration conse-
quences. Descamps v. United States involved a criminal case
where the defendant, Descamps, was convicted in 1978 for the
burglary of a grocery store.109 The 1978 conviction was under
a state statute that did not include unlawful entry as an ele-
ment of the crime. This charge was the defendant’s third vio-
lent felony in violation of the federal Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA), which imposes an enhanced conviction on the
defendant; however, the language of the ACCA includes
“unlawful entry” as an element of the crime.110 This presented
the question of whether the 1978 conviction could qualify
under the ACCA, which would require a modified categorical
approach to examine the facts of the 1978 conviction. The
Ninth Circuit found this element of the 1978 conviction satis-
fied by Descamps’s plea bargain; however, the United States
Supreme Court disagreed and reversed Descamps’s enhanced
conviction under ACCA.111 In her opinion, Justice Kagan
stated that the modified categorical approach is inapplicable to
a statute such as the ACCA, which contains a single, indivisi-
ble set of elements.112
The United States Supreme Court held in Moncrieffe v.
Holder that the traditional categorical approach to statutory
construction applies under a Georgia statute for marijuana
possession with intent to distribute.113 This result was due to
the mismatch of the Georgia statute to federal law under a cat-
egorical approach: the Georgia statute covers some criminal
conduct that falls outside the aggravated felony definition at
federal law, which carries immigration consequences.114 This
case reaffirms the court’s traditional reliance on the categorical
approach when comparing convictions under state criminal
statutes to applicable federal law.
Descamps and Moncrieffe assert a specific framework for
immigration judges in constructing statutes to determine
whether they match the general federal definition of a particu-
lar crime and can result in removal from the United States. The
initial step is always to use the categorical approach, some-
times known as the “minimum conduct” test: “does the mini-
mum conduct necessary to violate the statute match the
generic immigration definition at issue?”115 If the answer is no,
the modified categorical approach may be used but is restricted
to divisible statutes: it “is reserved only for statutes which set
forth multiple, separately defined offenses, one of which would
trigger the generic immigration definition.”116 Taken together,
the court’s holdings in Descamps and Moncrieffe can be con-
ceptualized as a three-part test. The following graphic repre-
sents the test that immigration judges engage in to determine
removability, which is further explained in subsections 1–3.
1. Step 1: Apply the Categorical Approach
Under both Descamps and Moncrieffe, the traditional categorical
approach is the first step of analysis. There must be a definitive
categorical match—the state criminal offense the immigrant
was convicted under must necessarily involve all the facts
required by the generic definition at federal law—for a statute
to qualify under the generic federal immigration definition.
2. Step 2: Determine Whether the Statute Is Divisible
If there is no definitive categorical match, the next step in the
analysis is to determine whether the statute of conviction is
divisible; that is, whether the statute contains one or more
offense in the alternative that a defendant may be charged
under. A keyword to identify such a statute is language such as
“or” (as in, “consuming alcohol or drugs”). An indivisible
statute is one that includes different elements an immigrant
could be convicted under but which cannot be separated under
the statute. Indivisible statutes often have general terms (e.g.,
“weapon”) instead of specific terms to differentiate offenses
(e.g., “knife or gun”).
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3. Step 3: If the Statute Is Indivisible, There Is No
Match, and the Defendant Is Not Removable. If the
Statute Is Divisible, Apply a Modified Categorical
Approach.
If the statute is indivisible, there is no match for the state
statute to federal law: the conviction cannot carry immigration
consequences because it is overbroad and includes conduct that
could reach nonremovable crimes. If the statute is divisible, the
immigration court may conduct a very limited modified cate-
gorical approach, including an examination of the record of
conviction by a trial court. The United States Supreme Court is
explicit that reviewing courts may not examine specific facts or
evidence in the record, even under a modified categorical
approach; instead, immigration courts may look at pleadings,
sentencing, and other limited records by the trial court.
III. CURRENT STATUTORY APPROACHES FOR ADVISING
NONCITIZEN CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN A TRIAL
COURT
Section I demonstrated the ambiguity of judges’ affirmative
duties with respect to noncitizen criminal defendants follow-
ing Padilla. Section II outlined the black letter federal law
regarding removal of noncitizens in criminal-conviction con-
texts. In this section, we discuss current statutory obligations
on trial court judges regarding informing noncitizen defen-
dants of potential removal consequences of convictions.
Although such advisements may not be explicitly required by
Padilla, the U.S. Constitution, or state constitutions, certain
jurisdictions have chosen to affirmatively require various types
of advisements to noncitizen criminal defendants.
A. CONSIDERATIONS FOR APPROACHING STATUTORY
ADVISEMENTS
There is currently some form of statutory judicial advisement
for immigrant criminal defendants in at least 28 jurisdictions.117
These statutory obligations impose different models of compli-
ance with Padilla and subsequent decisions, along with ethical
obligations imposed on judges.118 This section discusses a sam-
pling of five statutory obligations imposed on judges—from Cal-
ifornia, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and
Connecticut—representing a variety of alternatives that courts
have adopted to address the complicated issue of ensuring a
criminal immigrant defendant understands her rights regarding
the intersection of criminal and immigration law.
When evaluating potential approaches to statutory obliga-
tions on a trial court, it is important to consider certain factors
that impact how effective an advisement is. First, the immi-
grant criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination and Sixth Amendment due-process rights
should be protected under Padilla.119 There are also various
positive and negative consequences to different models of
advisement. Boilerplate language is easily administered and
broad, but it is also vague and potentially misunderstood by a
defendant. Allowing a defendant additional time to consider
her plea in light of the advisement ensures that she under-
stands potential immigration consequences, but it is poten-
tially inefficient for the trial court by opening it up to delay tac-
tics by defense counsel. Placing the burden on the defendant to
move to vacate a judgment if her advisement is insufficient
allows for efficiency in the court and allows a defendant a typ-
ical defense through criminal proceedings, but immigrant
defendants unfamiliar with English or the American judicial
system may be unaware of these rights. The trial court should
always balance efficiency for the judicial system against
stronger protections for defendants and should consider
unique issues facing immigrant defendants (such as language
barriers, unfamiliarity with the legal system, disparate educa-
tion levels, and fear of removal). In evaluating the proper
approach, a trial court should employ the strongest practical
protections from noncitizen defendants to ensure they fully
understand the potential consequences in immigration court.
Concerns regarding whether trial court judges are able to
consider immigration consequences in convictions and sen-
tencing have been clarified in part by the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA).  “[I]mmigration courts must determine
immigration consequences to an [immigrant] based on the
crime as charged and convicted and the sentence as deter-
mined by the state court judge, even if the criminal charge or
sentence was shaped by the prosecutor or judge in part to mit-
igate or maximize adverse immigration consequences on the
defendant.”120 The immigration judge will consider the sen-
tence and conviction, without regard to a trial court judge’s
consideration of immigration consequences, even when a
conviction is retroactively modified to alter immigration con-
sequences.121 These decisions by the BIA make it clear that a
trial court judge has the discretion to consider federal immi-
gration consequences of a conviction, and a judge should
accordingly be aware of and prevent unduly adverse conse-
quences that might arise from conviction.
B. STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS: FIVE EXAMPLES
This subsection will illustrate five of the current approaches
taken by legislatures in various jurisdictions to impose some
obligation on the court to inform noncitizen defendants of
potential immigration consequences from a criminal convic-
tion. Each model trial-court advisement serves as an exemplar
for a specific category of statutes. The statutes are quoted in
part to highlight their differences; some provisions have simi-
lar language and impact in their full text, but the purpose of
this illustration is to demonstrate the various individual provi-
sions used by trial courts. Following this chart is a substantive
discussion of the model advisements.
204 Court Review - Volume 50 
122. SDSC CRM-012 7d (Sept. 2011). 123. CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE ANN. § 1016.5 (West 1985).
It is important to note that these statutory duties create
mandatory minimums for courts. Individual courts or jurisdic-
tions may be permitted—depending on statutory language—to
provide additional protections for criminal defendants by
internal rules and procedures. For example, the Superior
Court of California, County of San Diego, provides more
detailed explanations of potential immigration consequences
on its plea form than is required by the California statute,
including a list of aggravated felonies under federal immigra-
tion law.122
1. Sample Policy #1: Broad Language (California)123
The court shall administer the following advisement on the
record to the defendant: If you are not a citizen, you are
hereby advised that conviction of the offense for which you
have been charged may have the consequences of deporta-
tion, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial
of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.
California was the first state to impose an obligation to
ensure effective assistance of counsel and inform immigrant
criminal defendants of potential immigration consequences.
The statutory language has been very influential and has been
repeated in other state statutes, including the District of
Columbia and Massachusetts (Model Advisements #2 and #3).
This language offers criminal defendants a quick summation of
the fact that there may be immigration consequences but is
standard language applied broadly to every defendant. While
this is a highly efficient option, this model alone does not offer
any protection to a noncitizen criminal defendant, nor does it
ensure any sort of informed plea that includes a full under-
standing of potential immigration consequences of a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere. Taken alone, this language is inade-
quate to meet the needs of immigrant defendants and does
nothing to prevent claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
under Padilla.
MODEL ADVISEMENTS RELEVANT STATUTORY LANGUAGE EFFECT OF THE LANGUAGE
BROAD LANGUAGE
(CALIFORNIA)
The court shall administer the following advisement
on the record to the defendant: If you are not a citi-
zen, you are hereby advised that conviction of the
offense for which you have been charged may have
the consequences of deportation, exclusion from
admission to the United States, or denial of natural-
ization pursuant to the laws of the United States.
This boilerplate language informs a defendant in the
most general manner that there may be potential
immigration consequences if she is convicted.
ADDITIONAL TIME IN
PLEA COLLOQUIES
(DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA)
Upon request, the court shall allow the defendant a
reasonable amount of additional time to consider the
appropriateness of the plea in light of advisement.
This statutory language allows the defendant to con-
sult with her attorney if she has not already, to deter-
mine what immigration effects may result from a con-
viction.
STATUTORY CONSEQUENCES FROM A
TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO INFORM
(MASSACHUSETTS)
If the court fails so to advise the defendant, and he
later at any time shows that his plea and conviction
may have or has had one of the enumerated conse-
quences, even if the defendant has already been
deported from the United States, the court, on the
defendant’s motion, shall vacate the judgment, and
permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of guilty,
plea of nolo contendere, or admission of sufficient
facts, and enter a plea of not guilty . . . .
If a trial court does not inform a criminal defendant
of potential immigration consequences, the court is
mandated to vacate the conviction and allow a new
plea to be entered if the defendant so moves. 
ENGAGING WITH THE DEFENDANT AND
HER COUNSEL
(MINNESOTA)
The judge must also ensure defense counsel has told
the defendant and the defendant understands: . . .
That if the defendant is not a citizen of the United
States, a plea of guilty to the crime charged may result
in deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization as a United
States citizen. 
This statutory provision mandates that courts verify
that defense counsel has done her duty under Padilla
to inform her client of potential immigration conse-
quences.
IMPOSING A BURDEN
ON THE COURT
(CONNECTICUT)
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere from any defendant in any criminal pro-
ceeding unless the court first addresses the defendant
personally and determines that the defendant fully
understands that if the defendant is not a citizen of
the United States, conviction of the offense for which
the defendant has been charged may have the conse-
quences of deportation or removal from the United
States, exclusion from readmission to the United
States or denial of naturalization . . . .
This provision mandates that a court must ensure a
defendant knows about potential immigration conse-
quences that may arise from a conviction. The burden
is on the court to ensure that this has been done.
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2. Sample Policy #2: Additional Time in Plea 
Colloquies (District of Columbia)124
Upon request, the court shall allow the defendant a reason-
able amount of additional time to consider the appropriate-
ness of the plea in light of advisement.
The District of Columbia has adopted California’s statutory
language in subsection (a) of its judicial obligation.125 Addi-
tionally, D.C. courts allow a “reasonable amount of additional
time to consider the appropriateness of the plea in light of
advisement.”126 This statutory language provides additional
protection for the immigrant criminal defendant by allowing
sufficient time to make an informed plea. The additional time
for the defendant to consider her plea after the advisement may
open the court to delay tactics and the potential for lengthy
continuances in some cases. However, limiting this to “reason-
able” additional time prevents improper delays. This type of
advisement should be used by courts to safeguard against inef-
fective counsel: allowing additional time to consider a plea, if
needed, further encourages defense counsel to fully inform her
client of immigration consequences.
3. Sample Policy #3: Statutory Consequences from a
Trial Court’s Failure to Inform (Massachusetts)127
If the court fails so to advise the defendant, and he later at
any time shows that his plea and conviction may have or
has had one of the enumerated consequences, even if the
defendant has already been deported from the United
States, the court, on the defendant’s motion, shall vacate the
judgment, and permit the defendant to withdraw the plea of
guilty, plea of nolo contendere, or admission of sufficient
facts, and enter a plea of not guilty . . . .
Massachusetts statutory language creates specific conse-
quences if a court fails to inform a noncitizen criminal defen-
dant of the potential for immigration consequences upon con-
viction: the court will vacate the judgment upon defendant’s
motion and allow her to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere. This sample advisement really conveys a consequence
and demonstrates the process a court will take in the absence
of a full advisement. The language provides a clear path for the
court to take if it fails to inform a noncitizen defendant. How-
ever, this consequence is only available upon the defendant’s
motion: noncitizen defendants, especially ones unfamiliar with
the American legal system, who may not speak English as a
first language, or who have deficient counsel, may go unaware
of this potential to vacate their judgment and enter a new plea.
The extended language of this statute also offers additional
protection to an immigrant criminal defendant by protecting
her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination: she
“shall not be required . . . to disclose to the court [her] legal
status in the United States” at any time.128 This statutory pro-
tection is essential protection for a noncitizen defendant
against revealing her immigration status.
SAMPLE POLICIES BENEFITS TO THE DEFENDANT BENEFITS TO THE COURT
BROAD LANGUAGE
(CALIFORNIA)
The defendant will be aware of the possibility of
immigration consequences of a conviction.
This is efficient for a court: the trial court judge reads
the statement for each defendant, regardless of immi-
gration status. There is no duty to do anything more
than read the mandated language.
ADDITIONAL TIME IN
PLEA COLLOQUIES
(DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA)
This allows a defendant and her counsel to have the
necessary time to make an informed plea decision to
avoid adverse immigration consequences.
While there exists a potential for delay tactics, this
may be efficient for the court over time by reducing
potential claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
under Padilla.
STATUTORY CONSEQUENCES FROM A
TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO INFORM
(MASSACHUSETTS)
This protects a defendant by creating statutory conse-
quences for the failure by a trial court to inform a
defendant of her potential immigration conse-
quences.
This language provides a clear statutory result of a
failure to inform a defendant. This encourages com-
pliance with the statute, and a statutory basis for
vacating a judgment upon failure to inform.
ENGAGING WITH THE DEFENDANT AND
HER COUNSEL
(MINNESOTA)
This requires that the defendant is not only informed
of, but also understands, the potential immigration
consequences of a conviction.
By engaging with defense counsel and the defendant,
personally, the trial court judge creates a clear record
that the defendant knows and understands immigra-
tion consequences of a criminal conviction.
IMPOSING A BURDEN
ON THE COURT
(CONNECTICUT)
A guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere will not be
accepted by the trial court without an affirmative
showing that the defendant knows about potential
immigration consequences.
This protects against uninformed pleas. This places a
burden on the court to show that it has verified a
defendant’s understanding of potential immigration
consequences, further encouraging judicial compli-
ance with the statutory obligation to inform a defen-
dant.
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133. We contacted the offices of the state courts in six jurisdictions
that have a statutory obligation for trial court judges to inquire
about the effectiveness of their statutory advisement. The juris-
dictions we contacted included the five discussed in our model
advisements above (California, District of Columbia, Massachu-
setts, Minnesota, and Connecticut) and Iowa. Our research plan
was to contact the administrative offices and ask the following
five questions:
1. How has Padilla v. Kentucky affected or influenced how
your state’s guidelines about noncitizen defendants have
been implemented?
2. Has your court seen very many Padilla claims on appeal
(anecdotally)?
3. Do you think your state’s statutory language about
advisements is adequate following Padilla? If not, what
changes should be made to it?
4. Do you keep any data on the number of Padilla claims?
5. How do you think judges feel about the statutory advise-
ment and the Padilla decision generally?
Each of the offices of our model advisements communicated a lack of
understanding that there was a statutory obligation imposed on trial
court judges, and nobody was clear who would be able to answer our
questions. Ultimately, most were unable or unwilling to answer any of
our questions. We received one reply from the Communications Offi-
cer of the Iowa Judicial Branch, who informed us that the state keeps
no data on Padilla claims and, because the state’s judicial advisement
(Iowa Rule of Crim. Procedure 2.8(2)(b)(3) (2002)) predates Padilla,
Iowa courts have not seen any significant changes since the Supreme
Court decision.
4. Sample Policy #4: Engaging with the Defendant
and Her Counsel (Minnesota)129
The judge must also ensure defense counsel has told the
defendant and the defendant understands: . . . That if the
defendant is not a citizen of the United States, a plea of
guilty to the crime charged may result in deportation, exclu-
sion from admission to the United States, or denial of natu-
ralization as a United States citizen. 
Minnesota imposes an obligation to engage with both the
criminal defendant and her counsel to ensure that the defen-
dant understands potential consequences of a conviction. This
judicial obligation protects the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
due-process rights but is silent on her Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. While it offers a strong addition to
the repertoire of potential advisements by ensuring that a
defendant understands her potential consequences, this falls
short by omitting from statutory language that the court
should not inquire into a defendant’s citizenship status. The
statutory language appears to only apply to noncitizen defen-
dants; unless such a statutory scheme is applied to every crim-
inal defendant regardless of citizenship status, this may pres-
sure a noncitizen to divulge her status or feel she must keep it
secret, even from her lawyer. A judicial advisement should not
place this uncertainty on a noncitizen defendant or in any way
deter client-attorney communication.
5. Sample Policy #5: Imposing a Burden on the Court
(Connecticut)130
The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere from any defendant in any criminal proceeding
unless the court first addresses the defendant personally and
determines that the defendant fully understands that if the
defendant is not a citizen of the United States, conviction of
the offense for which the defendant has been charged may
have the consequences of deportation or removal from the
United States, exclusion from readmission to the United
States or denial of naturalization . . . .
The Connecticut statute regarding Padilla advisement goes
the furthest of the state statutes to impose a burden on the
court to determine whether the defendant understands the
possible immigration consequences of a guilty plea or a plea of
nolo contendere.131 The full statute provides many of the pro-
tections other courts have imposed (additional time to con-
sider a plea, Fifth Amendment protection from disclosing her
legal status in the United States, and the ability to withdraw
her plea if the court fails its obligation) but goes a step further
to impose the burden on the court to not accept a guilty plea
or plea of nolo contendere until the court addresses the defen-
dant and determines that she “fully understands” potential
immigration consequences. This requires that a trial court
judge ensure the defendant has effective assistance of counsel,
potentially eliminating the need for a Padilla claim if done
properly and consistently. However, the language also imposes
a three-year statute of limitations on the defendant if she qual-
ifies to withdraw a guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere.132
This limits the opportunity for noncitizen defendants to take
advantage of their rights under Padilla if they do not take affir-
mative action before the tolling of the statute of limitations,
which could negatively affect the very noncitizen defendants
the statute seeks to protect if they are unaware of their rights
and have ineffective defense counsel.
C. SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT STATUTORY
OBLIGATIONS
It is apparent that trial court judges’ statutory obligations to
inform noncitizen criminal defendants of potential immigra-
tion consequences during proceedings is not widely under-
stood, even by the courts themselves. After an unsuccessful
survey133 of the courts in various jurisdictions, we have con-
cluded that statutory obligations must better serve their pur-
pose in their respective jurisdictions: education regarding
potential immigration consequences from criminal convictions
should be made available not only to trial court judges, but
also to court administrators. This readily available information
would be valuable to various parties: criminal defendants, who
may be directly affected by an advisement; criminal lawyers,
who may not have a background in immigration law; individ-
ual judges, who may need clarification of their judicial obliga-
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tions; and court administrators, to verify that each court is ful-
filling its statutory obligations.
IV. PROPOSED MODEL ADVISEMENT
It is our recommendation that a trial court should use the
following model advisement for every criminal defendant each
time she appears before the court, including before accepting a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere:
This court will not inquire into your citizenship status dur-
ing this criminal proceeding. You should know, however,
that if you are not a citizen of the United States, a criminal
conviction may have adverse immigration consequences,
such as removal from the United States or ineligibility for
certain forms of immigration benefits or relief. A conviction
in this court may also affect your immigration status and
the ability for you to travel to other countries, depending on
their respective immigration laws and policies.
If you do not understand or have had insufficient time to
consult with your attorney regarding your immigration sta-
tus and the potential consequences of a conviction, the court
shall grant you reasonable additional time to consult pri-
vately and confidentially with your attorney. Have you had
sufficient time to consult with your attorney regarding your
immigration status and the potential consequences of a con-
viction? Do you fully understand the potential immigration
consequences of a conviction, if applicable? Counsel, can
you verify that you have discussed the potential immigra-
tion consequences of a guilty plea with your client?
This court will not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
without first confirming that you have had the opportunity
to consult with your attorney regarding your immigration
status and the potential consequences of a criminal convic-
tion. If the court fails to verify that you are aware and
understand the potential consequences of your conviction,
the court shall, on the defendant’s motion, vacate the judg-
ment and permit you to withdraw your plea and enter a
plea of not guilty.
A. PROVISIONS OF THE MODEL ADVISEMENT
Our proposed model advisement for trial court judges
should apply to all criminal defendants, regardless of whether
they are noncitizens. A judge should not inquire into a defen-
dant’s citizenship status, nor should a defendant ever feel pres-
sured to reveal her status to the trial court. This initial state-
ment of the proposed advisement will protect the defendant’s
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and make it
clear there should be no pressure to divulge immigration sta-
tus to the trial court.134 To effectively ensure against self-
incrimination, this advisement should be given to all criminal
defendants at every hearing. 
The proposed advisement allows a defendant additional
time to consider her plea in light of potential immigration con-
sequences that result from a criminal conviction (including a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere) if she has not consulted with
her attorney or does not fully understand the potential conse-
quences of a plea. This additional time should be reasonable
under the circumstances of the case, and the length of the addi-
tional time should be discretionary.135 It is essential to remem-
ber when deciding the reasonable length of additional time to
consider a plea that, despite the severity under criminal law, a
conviction may carry more severe consequences—including
removal—in immigration law.136
The advisement engages with both the defendant and her
defense counsel to verify that she fully understands the poten-
tial consequences of a conviction and that her counsel has ade-
quately informed her. This places an affirmative duty on the
defense counsel to fulfill its obligations under Padilla while
allowing the court to safeguard against ineffective assistance.
The questions directed at the defendant and her counsel
encourage them both to listen to and understand the advise-
ment in its totality and creates a record that the court
attempted to ensure proper representation by the defense
counsel under Padilla.
Further, this advisement places a burden on the court to
ensure that it does not accept a plea until it verifies that a
defendant understands the potential immigration conse-
quences.137 If the record is silent regarding judicial advisement,
there should be a presumption that the court has not properly
informed the defendant, and the judgment should be vacated
upon defendant’s motion. There should be no statute of limita-
tions on the defendant’s right to move to vacate the judgment
if there has been no effective judicial advisement: noncitizen
defendants who do not fully understand the potential immi-
gration consequences should be able to effectively navigate the
trial court system and take full advantage of their protections
under the law. This final paragraph in the advisement could
alternatively be adopted as a model principle: instead of advis-
ing each criminal defendant of the process, the trial court may
instead adopt the purpose of the confirmation in practice and
allow the defendant additional time to confer with her lawyer
if necessary.
To ensure the defendant’s protection, this advisement
should be given every time a defendant appears before the
court. In preliminary hearings, the advisement will direct the
defense counsel to consult with her client before entering a
plea. During a plea colloquy, it will ensure that proper repre-
sentation has occurred before entering a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere. During sentencing, such a statement will remind a
defendant of potential consequences and her ability to raise a
claim under Padilla if she has not been effectively represented
or, alternatively, to move to vacate the judgment by the court
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and enter a new plea of not guilty if the court has not previ-
ously informed her.
B. WHAT SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THE MODEL
ADVISEMENT
We did not include examples of specific crimes as a provi-
sion of the model advisement. For example, an advisement
could potentially inform a criminal defendant: “Some common
crimes that carry immigration consequences include drug offenses,
theft, assault, and battery.” Alternatively, as the Superior Court
of California, County of San Diego, has done, courts could pro-
vide plea forms that include specific aggravated felonies that
are removable offenses.138 Although including common crimes
as examples of removable offenses, such as drug possession or
crimes involving moral turpitude, would more effectively
inform a defendant of potential immigration consequences
specific to her offense, it is likely that such an advisement
could have a negative—and improper—effect in immigration
court. If it becomes necessary for an immigration judge to use
a modified categorical approach to determine removability, the
immigration judge will have access to limited records of con-
viction, including the judicial advisement. If the immigration
judge reads the specific crime in the advisement without the
context of the case, she may rule a noncitizen is removable in
circumstances where a silent record would not result in
removal. For example, signaling “drug offenses” as a remov-
able offense may lead an immigration court to conclude that an
immigrant is removable on a modified categorical approach for
a divisible statute, even when the charge is only for simple per-
sonal possession of marijuana under 30 grams (which is not a
removable offense).139 Additionally, where crimes involving
moral turpitude are unclear under the federal definition,
crime-specific advisements may lead to improper removal: if
the advisement signals removability, this may lead an immigra-
tion judge to incorrectly conclude removability where the ele-
ments of the potential CIMT are unclear at federal law.140 Stat-
ing specific examples of removable offenses in a judicial
advisement would ultimately be counterproductive and result
in increased removal of convicted noncitizens in circumstances
where they may otherwise be permitted to remain in the
United States. It may be possible to avoid these consequences
with careful consideration of what to include on a plea form or
in an oral judicial advisement, but this determination should
be made by individual jurisdictions; our model proposal is
meant to provide adequate protections for noncitizen criminal
defendants in any jurisdiction and may be modified to become
more effective in specific jurisdictions.
C. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE TRIAL
COURT
We recommend that trial courts without statutory obliga-
tions adopt our proposed model advisement to effectively
allow noncitizen criminal defendants to assert their rights
under Padilla. To maximize the utility of the judicial advise-
ment, the court should apply the effect retroactively by court
precedent. This would allow a noncitizen previously unpro-
tected by such an advisement to assert her rights under Padilla,
vacate her judgment and enter a plea of not guilty, and maxi-
mize her rights under the law, even if she has already been
removed following a conviction in a criminal proceeding.
Even if a state legislature has not created a judicial duty that
requires an advisement, courts should adopt some form of this
proposed advisement to ensure that all defendants are aware of
potential immigration consequences from conviction. Trial
courts in jurisdictions that already have statutory obligations
to advise noncitizen defendants should take steps to further
maximize their advisement’s utility by incorporating our
model language and ensuring that all defendants’ rights are
sufficiently protected.
CONCLUSION
Trial court judges have always played a crucial role in safe-
guarding criminal defendants’ due-process rights, such as
access to effective assistance of counsel and the ability to make
knowing, intelligent pleas. Through the Padilla decision, the
United States Supreme Court has now expressed an interest in
protecting the unique interests of noncitizens appearing in
state and federal criminal proceedings. The Padilla decision
applies directly to defense attorneys, but we have demon-
strated the benefits when trial court judges also adopt proce-
dures to uphold the rights of noncitizen criminal defendants.
This is best illustrated by our recommended model advisement
in section IV. We recommend that all trial court judges become
familiar with the relevant immigration consequences that
come from criminal convictions as stated in the INA, discussed
in section III, and employ an advisement to inform noncitizens
of their rights and the potential immigration consequences of
their criminal convictions.
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TRAINING MATERIALS
Court-Staff Training Materials
http://goo.gl/xN6MNH 
The Maryland Access to Justice Com-
mission has excellent resources for court
staff to use in learning how they can—
and cannot—help self-represented liti-
gants. There’s a bench card and poster
listing the things staff can do (such as
explaining how the court works) and
things it cannot do (like letting someone
talk to the judge outside of court or
telling someone what to say in court).
Answers to questions about what staff
may do often are not self-explanatory to
court staff, and the Maryland Commis-
sion has offered a handy checklist.
There’s also an 18-minute training
video for court staff on how to respond
to inquiries from litigants. Additional
materials for self-assessment and for peer
training accompany the video. These
materials could easily be adapted for use
in other states.
Judicial Training Materials
Access Brief: http://goo.gl/nmWt6E  
Curriculum: http://goo.gl/7VHLuk 
The Center on Court Access to Justice
for All has two recent additions targeted
to judges. First, a March 2014 “Access
Brief” explains the trend toward greater
judicial engagement. The paper, written
by Richard Zorza and National Center
for State Courts researcher Pamela Casey,
discusses an approach called “engaged
neutrality” in which judges provide
greater guidance to self-represented liti-
gants while maintaining neutrality. The
Access Brief also provides an overview of
a detailed set of training materials for
judges.
That training curriculum is available
in full on the website. It includes Power-
Point presentations and background
materials on various questions about
dealing with self-represented litigants,
including techniques to use and answers
to judicial-ethics questions.
w
GENERAL RESOURCES
Center on Court Access
to Justice for All
http://www.ncsc.org/atj
The National Center for State Courts
has established a web-based Center on
Court Access to Justice for All, which
seeks to assist judges and courts in pro-
viding better access to justice. The Cen-
ter works with a number of national
organizations, including the American
Judges Association, to implement realis-
tic access-to-justice solutions.
One key feature of the Center is a series of
“Access Briefs,” short papers on key topics for
access to justice. The first paper, issued in
November 2012, was on self-help services
(http://goo.gl/FvGvl). It’s an 11-page paper
setting out various options for providing help
to the self-represented litigant, with examples
of courts that have set up useful websites,
courthouse desks or offices, telephone-based
programs, in-person clinics, and courtroom
assistance. 
The Center offers three webinars: (1)
Self-Represented Litigation Curriculum,
covering a wide variety of materials
available for judicial training; (2) Proce-
dural Fairness and Self-Represented Liti-
gants; and (3) Forms Development. The
procedural-fairness webinar, presented
by Minnesota state trial judge Kevin
Burke, is available on the website with-
out registration. The other two require
registration, available by contacting the
Center.
The Center also offers technical assis-
tance to state and local courts seeking
help in providing better access to justice.
Click the “Assistance” tab on the Cen-
ter’s home page and you’ll find more
information and a link to the “technical
assistance request form.”
Self-Representation Resource Guide, 
National Center for State Courts
http://goo.gl/UQ9t0b 
The National Center for State Courts
also has an excellent online resource
guide that provides links to articles, web-
based resources, and organizations deal-
ing with how to improve services to self-
represented litigants. 
One of the articles included on the
website, by Richard Zorza, looks at the
implications of the United States
Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Turner
v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). In
Turner, the Court held that a child-sup-
port obligor’s due-process rights were
violated when he was jailed for nonpay-
ment without either an appointed attor-
ney or the benefit of “substitute proce-
dural safeguards.” The Court listed safe-
guards such as a notice to the obligor
that his ability to pay would be a critical
issue, the use of a form to elicit relevant
financial information, the opportunity
for him to respond to questions about his
finances, and an express court finding
that he had the ability to pay. Zorza
argues that the Court’s conclusion that
due process could be met by using such
procedural safeguards with self-repre-
sented parties should be a signal to
courts to improve their services to the
self-represented. 
The Resource Page: 
Focus on Self-Represented Litigants
e
